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Crossing the Constitutional Line: Due Process and
the Law Enforcement Justification
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that
are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, exis-
tence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe
the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omni-
present teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole peo-
ple by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end
justifies the means-to declare that the Government may com-
mit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private crimi-
nal-would bring terrible .retribution. Against that pernicious
doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.!
I. INTRODUCTION
Undercover operations such as reverse stings2 contribute sub-
stantially to the detection, investigation, .and prosecution of
crime.' Nevertheless, these operations may also create serious risks
to private persons' property, privacy, and civil liberties, and may
compromise law enforcement itself.4 Accordingly, courts must ap-
ply standards that will achieve the proper balance between effec-
tive law enforcement techniques and the preservation of civil liber-
ties.5 The due process defense6 has the potential to provide this
1 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 A reverse sting is a narcotics operation in which law enforcement agents sell
drugs to private citizens and then arrest the purchasers. A buy and bust operation in-
volves the same concept, but in these cases the agents purchase the drugs from private
citizens and then arrest the sellers. For the purposes of this Note, both techniques will
be referred to as reverse stings.
3 See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON UNDERcOVER AcTxTIEs OF COMPONENTS OF THE




6 The due process defense stems from the Fifth Amendment mandate that every
citizen must be afforded due process of law. In the reverse sting context, this principle
has been interpreted to mean that a defendant may not be punished if the government
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necessary protection. The vagueness of the doctrine, however, and
the reluctance of the Supreme Court to delineate its parameters
with any kind of certainty, has rendered the due process defense
largely ineffective. Although it is admittedly necessary for the due
process defense to remain a flexible tool with which to judge
unique circumstances, the almost complete lack of structure of the
defense has undermined its viability.
The due process doctrine has been vexed by .the fact that
typically the issue arises in the context of aggravated narcotics or
corruption cases, in which incredible pressure is exerted on courts
to sustain convictions. Most courts examine due process from the
point of view of the defendant, judging the defense as a method
whereby an otherwise guilty person is spared punishment. The
strong social and political mandate for combatting criminal activity
provides a strong disincentive for a judge to hold that a defendant
must be set free, even though his guilt has been proven. Accord-
ingly, the due process defense is basically a nullity.
Some type of standard is needed to determine when conduct
becomes so outrageous that the due process defense is available to
a defendant. This standard can be found by tying the due process
defense to the law enforcement justification. Both doctrines are
predicated on the belief that a democratic society cannot condone
methods of law enforcement which are themselves lawless. 7 Ac-
cordingly, the point at which government officers so exceed their
official duties that they are stripped of the law enforcement justifi-
cation is also the point at which government conduct can be
termed outrageous enough to warrant the due process defense.
Analyzing due process from the other side-via the law enforce-
ment justification-would allow courts to objectively judge the
government's actions without the strong bias against granting the
defense no matter what the underlying factual circumstances. Such
an approach would provide a principled basis for the delineation
of the due process defense.
This Note will begin by providing a brief overview in Part II
of the due process defense in the reverse sting context. The evolu-
tion of the due process defense will be analyzed in Part III. Part
III will examine the four Supreme Court cases, beginning with
acted in an outrageous manner when coxisbatting the crime for which the defendant was
charged.
7 See Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 276 (1855) ("The words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey
the same meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land,' in Magna Charta.').
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Sorrells v. United States,' that dealt with ihe entrapment defense
and ultimately led to the due process defense, followed by the
circuit courts' approach to due process claims in reverse sting
cases. Part IV will analyze the various attempts to define the pre-
cise parameters of the due process defense and the meaning of
outrageous government conduct. Finally, Part V will examine the
law enforcement justification and propose a methodology for uti-
lizing the law enforcement justification to define the contours of
the due process defense.
II. OVERVIEW
Reverse sting operations are becoming an increasingly popular
mode of combatting narcotics offenses in the United States. A re-
verse sting is an undercover operation in which law enforcement
officers sell drugs that -have previously been confiscated. The
agents arrange drug deals with potential buyers, monitor these
deals, and then arrest the purchasers after the sale has been com-
pleted.9 In many of these situations, the purchasers, after being
arrested and charged, have attempted to assert the defenses of
entrapment ° or due process."
8 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (8-1 decision).
9 United States v. Walther, 867 F.2d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
848 (1989); accord Owen v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1519, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curi-
am), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1071 (1987).
10 See generally Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454 (Roberts, J., concurring) ("Entrapment is. the
conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commis-
sion by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or
fraud of the officer.").
Professor Webster of the Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University, dis-
cussing the origins of the entrapment defense, observes "the entrapment defense is re-
cent and peculiarly American. Because English common law generally rejects the concept,
the origin of entrapment is novel and limited to American jurisprudence." Laura G. Web-
ster, Building a Better Mousetrap: Reconstructing Federal Entrapment Themy from Sorrells to
Mathews, 32 ARiz. L. REv. 605, 614 (1990) (footnotes omitted). Professor Webster also
remarks: "Neither legislative enactment nor constitutional compulsion empowered the
Court to act [in tde entrapment area]." Id. at 616 (footnote omitted).
11 See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960) ("[Due
process] has to do ... with the denial of that 'findamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice.'" (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942))). This
basic definition has been narrowed by Justice Rehnquist's interpretation that a violation
of due process "come[s] into play only when the Government activity in question violates
some protected right. of the defendant." Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490
(1976) (plurality decision).
As noted in United States v. Bogait "Strictly speaking, an assertion of outrageous con-
duct against the government is not a 'defense' because, if successful, it results in the
dismissal of the indictment whatever its merits. Since most courts identify it as a 'de-
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The due process defense arises from the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, which states: "No person shall
be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ... ."" By contrast, the entrapment defense is a
judicially-imposed exception to statutory criminal prohibitions. The
entrapment defense is premised on the notion that a defendant,
even though he committed a crime, should not be punished if the
crime was instigated by the government. Thus, while the due pro-
cess and entrapment defenses are often raised together, they
should be "distinctly and significantly different."" First, the en-
trapment defense looks to the defendant's predisposition to com-
mit the crime before any government instigation, while the due
process claim examines whether the actions of government officers
violated those standards "'implicit in the concept of ordered liber-
ty.,,,1
4 Second, entrapment is normally a question of fact for the
fense,' that nomenclature is used here." United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1432 n.2
(9th Cir.), vacated sub nom. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986)
(remanded for further findings of fact).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13 Paul Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment Cases: TIe Journey Back, 27 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 457, 458 (1990). See also United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607-08
(3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982):
We must be careful not to undermine the Supreme Court's consistent
rejection of the objective test of entrapment by permitting it to reemerge
cloaked as a due process defense. While the lines between the objective test of
entrapment favored by a minority of the Justices and the due process defense
accepted by a majority of the Justices are indeed hazy, the majority of the Court
has manifestly reserved for the constitutional defense only the most intolerable
government conduct.
See also Molly K. Nichols, Note, Entrapment and Due Process: How Far Is Too Far?, 58 TUL.
L. REV. 1207, 1212 (1984) (defining due process as a "test of entrapment similar to the
objective approach, but with constitutional dimensions . . ."). The article asserted:
The suggestion in Russell that a conviction might be precluded because gov-
ernment actions constituted a denial of the defendant's right to due process cre-
ated an anomaly. The Court emphatically touted the subjective view of entrap-
ment, with its strict focus on the defendant's state of mind. It then proceeded
to suggest a defense of constitutional dimensions, based on judicial scrutiny of
the government's investigatory conduct. The theory of barring prosecutions on
the latter ground initially appeared to be suspiciously akin to the objective view
of entrapment that was so vehemently rejected by the Russell plurality. This ap-
parent contradiction can best be explained by the fact that, although the due
process defense in the area of entrapment was novel, the Court had previously
recognized a similar defense in other areas of criminal law.
Id. at 1213.
14 Marcus, supra note 13, at 458 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
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jury, while due process is a question of law for the judge since it
involves examining constitutional limitations.
5
Although a consistent minority has advocated that entrapment
be judged by looking at the quality of the government's con-
duct, 6 this view has never been adopted by the Court. The
Court's position regarding the due process defense is not quite as
clear. Unlike entrapment, due process is grounded in the Consti-
tution, yet no specific criteria for the defense has been formulated
by the Court. From the dicta in United States v. Russel 7 and
Hampton v. United States" it appears that, unlike the majority view
of entrapment, even if a defendant were predisposed to commit
the crime, he may still assert a due process defense if he can
demonstrate that government conduct was outrageous.19 Outra-
geous government conduct has been defined as including "situa-
tions where the police conduct involved unwarranted physical, or
perhaps mental, coercion,"20 as well as "cases where the crime is
fabricated entirely by the police to secure the defendant's convic-
tion rather than to protect the public from the defendant's con-
tinuing criminal behavior."2' While this language indicates that a
15 Id. at 459.
16 See infra notes 49, 57, 72, 86 and accompanying text.
17 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (5-4 decision).
18 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (plurality decision).
19 See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 497 (Brennan, J:, dissenting):
I agree with Mr. Justice Powell [concurring] that Russell does not foreclose impo-
sition of a bar to conviction-based upon our supervisory power or due process
principles-where the conduct of law enforcement authorities is sufficiently offen-
sive, even though the individuals entitled to invoke such a defense might be
"predisposed."
See also Russell 411 U.S. at 431-32 (noting that law enforcement conduct could be so out-
rageous that principles of due process would bar conviction).
20 United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir.), vacated sub nom. United
States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanded for further findings of
fact).
21 Id. See also United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607 (3d Cir.) (en banc) ("It is
plain from the Court's opinions in Russell and the separate opinions in Hampton, howev-
cr, that a successful due process defense must be predicated on intolerable government
conduct which goes beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment defense."), cert. de-
nied 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); Dennis Franks, Note, Constitutional Law--Entrapment and Due
Process of Law-The Efficacy of ABSCAM Type Operations, 5 CAMPBELL L. REV. 377, 405
(1983) (attempting to distinguish which fhctors detennine when government behavior
becomes "outrageous"); Karen M. Poole, Note, ien Use of the Entrapment Defense Is
Barred; Is There a Viable Alternative Defense?, 5 COOLEY L. REv. 203, 217 (1988) (after dis-
cussing factors courts examine to determine if government conduct was "outrageous,"
concludes that "the behavior of the government has to be brutal or psychologically coer-
cive to qualify as a due process violation; governmental informants can use 'artifice and
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due process defense is available to a defendant in a reverse sting,
circuit court decisions have revealed that such a defense is avail-
able more in theory than in reality.2 Although due process is
clearly grounded in a constitutional mandate against lawlessness,
beyond the generalized prohibitions against violence and complete
fabrication of crime, neither the Supreme Court nor the lower
courts have provided any objective criteria for the defense.
Due to the policy considerations underlying narcotics cases,
very few courts have reversed convictions based on entrapment or
due process grounds. While the defenses of entrapment and due
process are theoretically available to a defendant in the United
States, courts have uniformly declined to accept such defenses in
the vast majority of reverse sting cases. 2' Apart from the current
policy reasons attendant to the "war on drugs,"24 and the conse-
stratagem' to gain the suspect's confidence; and the informant's activity, if unknown to
the governmental agency, cannot be directly attributable to it.").
22 See United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1272 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omit-
ted):
The Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibility that the government's
active participation in a criminal venture may be of so shocking a nature as to
violate a defendant's right to due process, notwithstanding the defendant's pre-
disposition to commit the crime. While acknowledging the possibility that the
government might in some hypothetical circumstances go too far, we have yet to
review a situation where official conduct crossed the constitutional line; rather,
an unbroken string of First Circuit cases has repulsed attempts to win dismissal
of criminal charges on such a theory.
See generally Marcus, supra note 13, at 457 ("Defendants claiming due process violations in
entrapment cases have not fared well in federal or state courts.").
23 United States v. Bogart in 1986 stated that only two circuits had dismissed indict-
ments based upon the due process outrageous governmental conduct defense. 783 F.2d
at 1434 (footnote omitted).
The issue of the due process defense is also applicable to other types of "sting"
operations, such as ABSCAM. However, because of the complexity of the issues involved,
this Note primarily addresses the due process defense in the context of reverse sting
operations.
24 See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495-96 n. 7 (1976) (plurality decision)
(Powell, J., concurring) ("One cannot easily exaggerate the problems confronted by law
enforcement authorities in dealing effectively with an expanding narcotics traffic, which is
one of the major contributing causes of escalating crime in our cities. Enforcement offi-
cials therefore must be allowed flexibility adequate to counter effectively such criminal
activity." (citations omitted)); Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267; see also United States v. Twigg, 588
F.2d 373, 380 (3d Cir. 1978) (2-1 decision) ("We are mindful of the difficulties of defin-
ing specific limits on law enforcement techniques. Recognition must be given to the
many challenges confronting police agencies today, especially in the drug law enforce-
mnent area."); Id. at 389 (Adams, J., dissenting):
Although there is reason to question this sort of law enforcement, I cannot say
that it shocks my conscience or that it reaches a demonstrable level of outra-
geousness beyond my toleration. This is so in part because I recognize the diffi-
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quent reluctance to allow a defense to persons involved with nar-.
cotics,' one underlying reason that courts have not afforded de-
fendants a due process defense in sting operations is the inability
to delineate precisely what conduct amounts to that level of outra-
geousness which violates due process. 26 Numerous courts and
commentators have struggled with this problem, and most analyses
result in a case-by-case examination of which factors have previous-
ly been found to violate due process.2 7 It is widely agreed the
due process defense involves a difficult area of the law, and that
"[t]he point of division at the margins between police conduct
that is just acceptable and that which goes a fraction too far prob-
ably cannot be usefully defined in the abstract."
28
culties faced by the DEA in combatting the spread of illegal drugs.
This attitude toward criminality is by no means reserved only for narcotics defenses.
In 1932 Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States acknowledged that "[s]ociety is at war
with the criminal classes, and courts have uniformly held that in waging this warfare the
forces of prevention and detection may use traps, decoys, and deception to obtain evi-
dence of the commission of crime." 287 U.S. 435, 453-54 (1932) (8-1 decision) (Roberts,
J., concurring). In 1981, commenting on the ABSCAM tactics, Judge Pratt stated:
The cynicism and hippocracy displayed by corrupt officials, pretending to serve
the public good, but in fact furthering their own private gain, probably pose a
greater danger to this country than ,all the drug traffickers combined. Corrupt
leaders not only betray their constituents, but also contribute to a moral decay
in American society that many view as the forerunner of economic, political and
social disaster.
United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affid in part and rev'd
and remanded in part on other grounds, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982).
25 See United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Prosecutors and
their agents naturally tend to assign great weight to the societal interest in apprehending
and convicting criminals; the danger is that they will assign, too little to the rights of citi-
zens to be free from government-induced criminality.").
26 See Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1435 ("As the Third Circuit has aptly observed, the deter-
mination of when the government's behavior reaches such a 'demonstrable level of
outrageousness' to constitute a due process violation is 'at best elusive.'"); United States
v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 1981) (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("Although provid-
ing a rudimentary framework for analysis, neither Russell nor Hampton delineated with
clarity the point at which Government involvement becomes shocking and outrageous."),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982); Twgg, 588 F.2d at 385 (Adams, J., dissenting) ("Admit-
tedly, it is difficult to know what standards to apply, in order to conclude that a given
course of action is 'outrageous.'"). See generally Nichols, supra note 13.
27 See generally Tobias, 662 F.2d 381; Franks, supra note 21; Nichols, supra note 13;
Poole, supra note 21; Maura F. J. Whelan, Note, Lead -Us Not Into (Unwarranted) Tempta-
tion: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense with a Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 1193 (1985).
28 Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1438. The court continued: "As a matter of general principle,
we have recognized that, in order to apprehend those engaged in serious crime, govern-
ment agents may lawfully use methods that are neither appealing nor moral if judged by
abstract norms of decency." Id.
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Unfortunately, this type of ad hoc approach has prevented
due process from becoming a truly viable defense. Yet, courts
appear reluctant to countenance any type of line-drawing, prefer-
ring to leave the boundaries of due process hazy, at best.29 Judge
Easterbrook expressed this concern in United States v. Miller.s0 In
Miller the defendant protested the government's use of a paid
informant-who was both addicted to drugs and had previously
been sexually involved with the defendant-to orchestrate the
defendant's sale of cocaine to a narcotic enforcement agent. Con-
curring in the court's decision not to reverse the conviction, Judge
Easterbrook called into question the necessity and effectiveness of
the due process defense. The recognition of such a defense, he as-
serted, poses problems of consistency because the circuits which
do acknowledge its existence cannot agree on its application."s
Finally, Judge Easterbrook posited:
Any line we draw would be unprincipled and therefore not
judicial in nature. More likely there would be no line; judges
would vote their lower intestines. Such a meandering, personal
approach is the antithesis of justice under law, and we ought
not indulge it. Inability to describe in general terms just what
makes tactics too outrageous to tolerate suggests that there is
no definition-and "I know it when I see it" is not a rule of
any kind, let alone a command of the Due Process Clause. 2
The end result has been not only to protect the due process de-
fense from "unprincipled" line-drawing, but to render the defense
impotent.
33
29 As one Note has suggested:
[Due process] should properly remain flexible, allowing a court discretion to
determine whether to invoke due process in a given case. To attempt to strictly
define the concept of due process would lead to constrainnient of the doctrine
itself. The issue of due process must be examined, as the court has directed, in
light of the totality of the circumstances of the case, with no one element being
determninative.
Nichols, supra note 13, at 1234-35.
30 891 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1989).
31 Id. at 1272 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
How much is "too much"? The nature of the question exposes it as (a) unan-
swerable, and (b) political. What, if anything, could separate stirring up of crime
in unpalatable ways here from the Operation Greylord methods [we] sustained?
From the "creative" endeavors in Abscam? From any of the "sting" operations?
From the rest of the sordid drug business, so dependent on caitiff assistants?
Id. at 1272-73 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
32 Id. at 1273 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
33 But see Marcus, supra note 13, at 458, which asserts that "the due process
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Yet this result is not necessary. If approached in Judge
Easterbrook's manner, from the defendant's vantage point rather
than the law enforcement officer's side, the problems he outlines
will inevitably arise because of the extra-judicial policy concerns
attendant to combatting crime. The option remains, however, to
analyze due process with an eye to the acceptability of the law
enforcement officer's conduct rather than the desirability of set-
ting a guilty defendant free. This methodology would provide a
principled and judicial framework for due process, while at the
same time allowing law enforcement officers the necessary latitude
in formulating the means to combat crime. A workable compro-
mise between the need for some type of concrete standard and
the equally compelling need for ad hoc determinations can be
found by tying the due process defense to the law enforcement
justification. An examination of the entrapment/due process cases
and the law enforcement justification cases reveals that there exists
a nexus where the law enforcement justification fails and the due
process defense should be awarded. By focusing on the point at
which government activity exceeds the protections of the law en-
forcement justification, courts can arrive simultaneously at the
point at which they should allow defendants' due process claims.
This approach provides a workable standard that would enable the
due process defense to become more than just a constitutional
theory.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DUE PROCESS DEFENSE
A. General Background
The due process defense, although distinct from the entrap-
ment defense, is inexorably tied to it. Accordingly, an analysis of
the due process defense must begin with an overview of entrap-
ment. Although the courts have struggled with the precise defini-
tion of entrapment, it has generally been agreed that entrapment
may be used as a defense when the defendant demonstrates he
was not predisposed to commit the crime, but rather was induced
by government actions.' Once the defendant makes this showing,
claim -while not thriving-is alive and beginning to be considered seriously . .. ."
34 See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) (9-0 decision) ("To deter-
mine whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the trap
for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."); Greene v. United
States, 454 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1972) ("Entrapment is shown where government
agents go beyond the mere affording of opportunities or facilities for the 'onmission of
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the burden rests with the government to prove that the defendant
did in fact have a predisposition to commit the crime charged. 5
If the government shows that the defendant was predisposed to
commit the crime, the entrapment defense is not available. 6 At
this point, however, the defendant may raise the due process de-
fense. 7
Generally, for a defendant to prove that he has been denied
due process, he must show that the government's conduct was
outrageous. United States v. RusselP8 defined such outrageous con-
duct as that which violates "that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to
the offense and exert persuasion or pressure of one kind or another which induces the
commission of a crime by one who had no predisposition to do so."); but see Sherman,
356 U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[A] test that looks to the character and
predisposition of the defendant rather than the conduct of the police loses sight of the
underlying reason for the defense of entrapment.").
35 See United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982):
[A] defendant who wishes to assert an entrapment defense must initially come
forward with evidence 'that the Government's conduct created a substantial risk
that the offense would be committed by a person other than one ready to com-
mit it.' Once the defendant has carried this burden, the govermnent must, if it
is to prevail, prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predis-
posed to commit the crime charged.
36 See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976) (plurality decision)
("We ruled out the possibility that the defense of entrapment could ever be based upon
governmental misconduct in a case, such as this one, where the predisposition of the
defendant -to commit the crime was established."); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
440 (1973) (5-4 decision) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[I]f [the defendant] had the
Ipredisposition' to commit the crime, or if the 'criminal design' originated with him,
then-regardless of the nature and extent of the Government's participation-there has
been no entrapment."); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1978) ("The
entrapment defense requires an absence of predisposition on the part of the defendant
to commit the crime."); but see Russell, 411 U.S. at 445 (Stewart, J., dissenting):
[W]hen the agents' involvement in criminal activities goes beyond the mere of-
fering of fuch an opportunity, and when their conduct is of a kind that could
induce or instigate the commission of a crime by one not ready and willing to
commit it, then-regardless of the character or propensities of the particular
person induced-I think entrapment has occurred. For in that situation, the
Government has engaged in the inpennissible manufacturing of crime, and the
federal courts should bar'the prosecution in order to preserve the institutional
integrity of the system of federal criminal justice.
37 See United States v. Bradley, 820 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Even a willing defen-
dant may claim a violation of due process if the government's conduct has reached a
'demonstrable level of outrageousness.'" (quoting United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 8
(1st Cir. 1985)) (citations omitted)); Trvigg, 588 F.2d at 378-79 ("The rule that is left by
Hampton is that although proof of predisposition to commit the crime will bar application
of the entrapment defense, fundamental fairness will not permit any defendant to be
convicted of a crime in which police conduct was 'outrageous.'").
38 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (5-4 decision).
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the universal sense of justice,' mandated by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment."3 9 Most courts that have upheld
the due process defense have done so only on the grounds that
the government manufactured the crime in question or that the
government in some way threatened the defendant with serious
physical injury.4" Due to the serious nature of drug offenses and
the difficulty of prosecuting such crimes, few courts have upheld
either. the entrapment -or the due process defense in cases involv-
ing narcotics violations. Courts have generally held that in order
to find a violation of.Jue process, "extreme circumstances of out-
rageous government conduct must be shown."41 Furthermore,
government infiltration of crime, oftentimes entailing the furnish-
ing of some item of value to the criminal enterprise, is almost uni-
formly accepted.42 Thus, while courts have paid lip 'service to the
due process defense in reverse sting cases, they have generally al-
lowed anti-narcotic policy considerations to control the final deter-
mination of whether to grant a defendant the defense.
B. Sorrells Through Hampton: The Supreme Court
Entrapment/Due Process Cases
The issue of entrapment and due process as defenses to re-
verse sting operations was developed in a line of Supreme Court
cases dating from 1932 to 1976. The entrapment defense is pre-
mised on the notion that a defendant, even though he committed
a crime, should not be punished if the crime was instigated by the
government. As such, entrapment provides a statutory exception to
39 Id. at, 432 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex reL Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246
(1960)).
40 See Bradlg, 820 F.2d at 7 ("Mainly these cases involve alleged overinvolvement on
the government's part in manufacturing the crime .... But, of course, outrageous con-
duct may take other forms, and might well be found in a threat of serious physical
harm."); United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omit-
ted), vacated sub nora. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986) (re-
manded for further findings of fact):
[A] number of courts have read Supreme Court precedent to confine the broad
due process check on the conduct of law enforcement officers only to that slim
category of cases in which the police have been brutal, employing physical or
psychological coercion against the defendant.. . . This narrow definition of
what constitutes outrageous government behavior relies on the Russell Court's
citation to Rodiin v. California as an example of the type of government activity
that would so "shock the conscience" that it would violate due process.
41 Owen v. Wainright, 806 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1071 (1987).
.42 Id.
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criminal punishment. In general, the Supreme Court has found
entrapment only in those cases where the government was respon-
sible for the creation of the crime itself, and then persuaded the
defendant to participate in this ready-made crime. Typical charac-
teristics of a successful entrapment claim include either repeated
importunings by the government agent that the defendant par-
ticipate in the criminal activity, or a lack of necessary knowledge
or expertise on the part of the defendant, thus requiring the spe-
cialized assistance of the government agent to complete the crime.
Since the majority view of entrapment requires that a defendant
not be predisposed to commit the crime in question, the defense
is unavailable to a large number of defendants in reverse sting
cases. Yet it is important to look at due process in light of entrap-
ment because many of the same policy considerations are at play
in both defenses, and because the due process defense has largely
gained prominence as a doctrine that originates from the point at
which the entrapment defense ends.
The first case to recognize the entrapment defense, Sorrells v.
United States,4" involved a defendant charged with violating the
National Prohibition Act.' A prohibition agent requested liquor
from the defendant three times, appealing to their common expe-
riences in World War I, before the defendant acquiesced and
procured $5.00 worth of alcohol for the agent.45 When subse-
quently indicted for possessing and selling one-half gallon of
whisky in violation of the Act, the defendant raised the defense of
entrapment.46 The Court began its analysis of the possible de-
fense by stating: "It is well settled that the fact that officers or
employees of the Government merely afford opportunities or facili-
ties for the commission of the offense does not defeat the pros-
ecution. Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those
engaged in criminal enterprises." 7 Moreover, the entrapment de-
fense should be granted if the criminal design originates with
government officials and "they implant in the mind of an inno-
cent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and
induce its commission in order that they may prosecute."4" The
Court ultimately granted the defendant's defense of entrapment
43 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (8-1 decision).
44 Id. at 438.
45 Id. at 439.
46 Id. at 438.
47 Id. at 441.
48 Id. at 442.
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and reversed the conviction, noting that though the predisposition
of the defendant must be taken into consideration, the controlling
question in an entrapment inquiry is 'whether the defendant is a
person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to
punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative
activity of its own officials. "49 Therefore, the Court defined the
entrapment defense primarily in terms of the predisposition of the
defendant to commit the crime (generally referred to as the sub-
jective standard), rather than the propriety of the government's
actions (referred to as the objective standard)." Nevertheless, the
language quoted above leaves open the question of precisely what
role the government's actions should play in determining the
applicability of the entrapment defense. Furthermore, the concur-
ring opinion stated that entrapment should focus on the
government's actions, not on the defendant's predisposition."'
The conflict between the objective and subjective standards
was addressed again twenty-six years later in Sherman v. United
States.12 In this case, a government informant met the defendant
during drug rehabilitation treatment and asked the defendant .to
supply him with narcotics."3 After initially refusing, the defendant
eventually supplied the informant with the drugs, partially because
the defendant desired to alleviate the informant's apparent suffer-
ing due to withdrawal.5 4 The informant then alerted the govern-
49 Id. at 451.
50 -rhe subjective or majority view focuses on the defendant's state of mind and his
predisposition to commit the crime. The objective or minority view focuses on the level
of governmental involvement in soliciting the crime." Webster, supra note 10, at 607
(footnotes omitted). See generally B. Grant Stitt & Gene G. James, Entrapment and the En-
trapment Defense: Dilemmas for a Democratic Society, 3 LAW & PHIL 111 (1984); Franks, supra
note 21; Cindy M. Harris, Note, Entrapment: A Source of Continuing Confusion in the Lower
Cours, 5 AM. J. TRiAL Anvoc. 293 (1981).
Professor Marcus observes that "[t]he federal system and about three-quarters of the
states use (the] 'subjective' approach. About a dozen states follow an 'objective' approach
to determine whether the government's conduct was inappropriate." Marcus, supra note
13, at 458 n.9.
51 The Sormels" concurrence stated:
The applicable principle is that courts must be closed to the trial of a crime
instigated by the government's own agents.' No other issue, no comparison of
equities as between the guilty official and the guilty defendant, has any place in
the enforcement of this overruling principle of public policy.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932) (8-1 decision) (Roberts, J., concur-
ring).
52 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
53 Id. at 371.
54 Id.
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ment to the defendant's illegal activities, at which point the defen-
dant was arrested on narcotics charges.5" Upon the defendant's
raising the defense of entrapment, the Court affirmed the decision
in Sorrells, asserting that the function of law enforcement is to pre-
vent crime and apprehend criminals, not to manufacture crime.
56
The Court recognized that the police must be allowed to use
stealth and strategy to combat crime, and that the mere affording
of opportunities or facilities to commit an offense does not consti-
tute entrapment. Nevertheless, the Court admonished that Con-
gress could not have intended its statutes to be enforced by a
government that implanted criminal designs in the minds of inno-
cent citizens for the sole purpose of procuring criminal prosecu-
tions.5 7 In the situation at hand, the Court determined that the
defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime, and thus the
entrapment defense should have been available to him.5 8 The
Court reversed the conviction on this basis. Nevertheless, once
again the concurring opinion stated that the focus of the entrap-
ment defense should be on the government, not the defendant,59
and that the conviction should have been reversed because of the
impropriety of the government's actions.'
Because of the tension between these two views-the subjec-
tive standard employed by the majority opinions in Sorrells and
Sherman, and the objective standard advocated by the concurrences
55 Id.
56 Id. at 372.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 373.
59 The Sherman concurrence posited that:
The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct it-
self is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmen-
tal power. For answer it is wholly irrelevant to ask if the "intention" to commit
the crime originated with the defendant or government officers, or if the crimi-
nal conduct was the product of "the creative activity" of law-enforcement officials.
Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
60 The concurrence continued:
No matter what the defendant's past record and present inclinations to
criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation of society, cer-
tain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated by
an advanced society. And in the present case it is clear that the Court in fact
reverses the conviction because of the conduct of the informer Kalchinian, and
not because the Government has failed to draw a convincing picture of
petitioner's past criminal conduct.
Id. at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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in these two cases-the Court addressed the entrapment issue for
a third time in 'United States v. RusseL61 A government agent went
to the defendants' home in an effort to locate a laboratory that
was illegally manufacturing methamphetamine.62 The agent of-
fered to supply the defendants with an essential ingredient (phe-
nyl-2-propanone) for one-half of the drug produced. ' - After the
drug was manufactured, the agent received his portion and then
bought part of the remaining one-half from the defendants.'
The defendants were later arrested, charged, and found guilty of
various drug-related offenses.' The circuit court held that the
defendants should have been allowed to assert an entrapment de-
fense due to the fact that the agent had supplied a scarce ingredi-
ent essential to the manufacture of the drug.' The Supreme
Court began its review of the circuit court decision by noting the
disagreement between the majority and concurring opinions con-
cerning entrapment in Sorrels and Sherman: 'The difference in the
view of the majority and the concurring opinions is that in the
former the inquiry focuses on the predisposition of the defendant,
whereas in the latter the inquiry focuses on whether the govern-
ment 'instigated the crime.' ' 67 The Court in Russell for a third
time defined entrapment in terms of the defendants' predisposi-
tion to commit the crime,' and thus reversed the circuit court,
upholding the original convictions of the defendants.69 Though
the Court refused to recognize the entrapment defense in this
case because the defendants were clearly predisposed to commit
the crimes charged, it did propose that such predisposition might
61 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (5-4 decision).
62 Id. at 425.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 426.
65 Id. at 424.
66 Russell characterized the circuit court's analysis in the following terms:
[T]he court in effect expanded the traditional notion of entrapment, which
focuses on the predisposition 'of the defendant, to mandate dismissal of a crimi-
nal prosecution whenever the court determines that there has been "an intolera-
ble degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise." In this case
the court decided that the conduct of the agent in supplying a scarce ingredient
essential for the manufacture of a controlled substance established that defense.
Id. at 427.
67 Id. at 429.
68 "It is only when the Government's deception actually implants the criminal design
in the mind of the defendant that the defense of entrapment comes into play." Id. at
436.
69 Id.
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not always prove a complete bar to any type of defense. In so
doing, Russell inaugurated the due process defense:
While we may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous
that due process principles would absolutely bar the govern-
ment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction,
the instant case is distinctly not of that breed..... The law
enforcement conduct here stops far short of violating that
"fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of jus-
tice," mandated by the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.
70
Although the Court appeared to be opening the door to a new
defense in cases where entrapment was not available, at the same
time it emphasized the policy considerations that would mandate a
drastic narrowing of either defense. 7 ' The Court remarked that it
does not seem "particularly desirable for the law to grant complete
immunity from prosecution to one who himself planned to com-
mit a crime, and then committed it, simply because government
undercover agents subjected him to inducements which might
have seduced a hypothetical individual who was not so predis-
posed. "72 Thus, the Court acknowledged that an entrapment de-
fense is available to- a defendant who is not predisposed to commit
the crime in question, and that even if the defendant is so predis-
posed, there may be instances when a due process defense can be
raised, it construed both of these defenses extremely narrowly.
The Court stated that the defense of entrapment "was not intend-
ed to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's foot' veto over law
70 Id at 431-32 (citations omitted).
71 Such policy considerations were described by Russell in the following manner:
The illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal inci-
dent, but a continuing, though illegal, business enterprise. In order to obtain
convictions for illegally manufacturing drugs, the gathering of evidence of past
unlawful conduct frequently proves to be an all but impossible task. Thus in
drug-related offenses law enforcement personnel have turned to one of the only
practicable means of detection: the infiltration of drug rings and a limited par-
ticipation in their unlawful present practices. Such infiltration is a recognized
and permissible means of investigation; if that be so, then the supply of some
item of value that the drug ring requires must, as a general rule, also be per-
missible. For an agent will not be taken into the confidence of the illegal entre-
preneurs unless he has something of value to offer them. Law enforcement
tactics such as this can hardly be said to violate "fundamental fairness" or [be]
"shocking to the universal sense of justice.
Id. at 432.
72 Id. at 434.
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enforcement practices of which it [does] not approve .... It is
only when the Government's deception actually implants the crimi-
nal design in the mind of the defendant that the defense of en-
trapmdnt comes into play.""3 In light of the difficulty in combat-
ting narcotics offenses, the Court apparently was willing to stretch
the bounds of due process to accommodate questionable law en-
forcement techniques. While the majority in Russell clearly reiterat-
ed the position taken in Sorrells and Sherman that the proper focus
of the entrapment defense is on the predisposition of the defen-
dant to commit the crime charged, the dissent in Russell, following
the concurrences in Sorrells and Sherman, asserted that the focus
should be on the government's conduct.74 Because this split in
analysis persisted, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of en-
trapment for a fourth time in Hampton v. United States.75 The case
arose out of a sale of heroin by the defendant to undercover drug
enforcement agents. 76 The sale was arranged by a Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) informant, who was a pool-playing ac-
quaintance of the defendant.77 According to the government, the
defendant noticed needle marks on the informant's arms and
consequently confided that he needed some money and had a
source for heroin.7' The informant then arranged a sale to the
undercover DEA agents, which ultimately resulted in the
defendant's arrest and subsequent conviction for distributing hero-
in.79 The defendant's story, however; was quite different. He
claimed that upon remarking that he was short of money, the in-
formant told him he had a pharmacist friend who could manufac-
ture a non-narcotic counterfeit drug that would produce the same
reaction as heroin." According to the defendant, he and the in-
73 Id. at 435, 436.
74 The Russell dissent asserted:
In my view, this objective approach to entrapment advanced by the Roberts
opinion in Sorrells and the Frankfurter opinion in Slhrman is the only one truly
consistent with the underlying rationale of the defense. Indeed, the very basis of
the entrapment defense itself demands adherence to an approach that focuses
on the conduct of the governmental agents, rather than on whether the defen-
dant was "predisposed" or "otherwise innocent."
Id. at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
75 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (plurality decision).
76 Id. at 485.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 486.
79 I. at 485-86.
80 Id. at 486-87.
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formant had successfully fooled one buyer before the fateful sale
of the counterfeit drug to the DEA." The jury rejected the
defendant's assertion that he did not know that the substance was
heroin, and found him guilty of distribution.82 The defehdant's
alternative defense of entrapment eventually reached the Supreme
Court. Unfortunately, rather than ending the predisposition versus
government conduct debate, the Court was unable to reach a
clear majority, and. ultimately handed down a plurality opinion
that reaffirmed the prior holdings that entrapment should be
determined according to the predisposition of the defendant rath-
er than the outrageousness of the government's conduct.'3 While
a majority apparently agreed on the entrapment issue,84 the court
was not able to reach a consensus concerning the viability of a
due process defense. The plurality stated: "If the police engage in
illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope of
their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpable
defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the applicable
provisions of state or federal law."85 The concurrence, however,
did not agree that a predisposed defendant should have no re-
course to a due process defense, asserting that they were "unwill-
ing to join the plurality in concluding that, no matter what the
circumstances, neither due process principles nor our supervisory
power could support a bar to conviction in any case where the
Government is able to prove predisposition."86 While the dissent
agreed with the concurrence that a due process defense should be
available to defendants based upon outrageous government con-
duct, 7 they disagreed with both the plurality and the concur-
rence that entrapment should be defined in terms of the
defendant's predisposition rather than the nature of the
government's conduct.' Consequently, rather than resolving the
81 Id. at 487.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 488-89.-
84 See Id. at 490 ("If the result of the governmental activity is to 'implant in the
mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its
commission . . . ' the defendant is protected by the defense of entrapment." (citation
omitted)); Id. at 492 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I agree with the plurality that Russel
definitively construed the defense of 'entrapment' to be focused on the question of pre-
disposition.").
85 Id. at 490.
86 Id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
87 Id. at 496-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88 Justice Brennan agreed with the views expressed in Justice Stewart's dissent in
Russel Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Sleman, and Justice Roberts' concurrence in
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issue of the proper defenses to reverse sting operations, Hampton
left the lower courts more confused than ever.
C. Post-Hampton: Overview
Because the Supreme Court's guidance concerning the proper
use of entrapment and due process as defenses to reverse sting
operations has been ambiguous, the lower courts have been reluc-
tant to permit either defense.89 Particularly since none of the
four Supreme Court cases addressing the issue held that a predis-
posed defendant could assert the entrapment defense, the vast
majority of convictions based -upon reverse stings have been up-
held.9" In general, courts seem to adhere to the reasoning in
United States v. Bradle 1 that narcotics offenses are difficult to in-
vestigate, and "are increasingly recognized as one of the nation's
most' serious problems .... They do not present a situation
where courts should be quick to recognize excuses."92
A brief overview of recent appellate cases addressing the possi-
ble defenses to reverse sting operations indicates that such police
activity is genetally not subject to either the entrapment or due
process defense.93 While the Court after Hampton seemed firmly
Sorl/s, that "'courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct
falls outside the proscription of the statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted,
the methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot
be countenanced.'" Id. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). He would have
reversed the conviction, holding that "conviction is barred as a matter of law where the
subject of the criminal charge is the sale of contraband provided to the defendant by a
Government agent." Id. at 500 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89 See United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267," 1272 (lst Cir. 1990), which stated that
the First Circuit has yet to dismiss a case based on a due process claim. Similarly, United
States v. Walther, 867 F.2d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir.), cert. denied; 493 U.S. 848 (1989) and
Owen v. Wainwright, 806 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1071 (1987), both noted the reluctance of the Eleventh Circuit to overturn convic-
tions resultant from reverse sting operations.
90 After mentioning that only two cases, Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th
Cir. 1971) and United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), have reversed con-
victions on due process grounds, the court in United States v. Bogart acknowledged that
"'the due process channel which Russell kept open is a most narrow one.'" United States
v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d
782, 789 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965 (1977)), vacated sub non?. United States
v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanded for further findings of fact).
91 820 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1987).
92 Id at 8.
93 Although numerous circuit courts have discussed the due process defense in the
reverse sting context, the cases discussed in this Note offer a representation of the most
recentC cases to specifically address the issues analyzed herein.
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entrenched in its view that entrapment turns upon the predisposi-
tion of the defendant, it never clearly defined due process. As a
result, the lower courts were left the task of determining what
types of government behavior should be considered lawless, so as
to trigger the due process defense. The lines drawn in these cases
appear strikingly similar to those employed in the entrapment
analyses. Although the courts have questioned government activity
that actively encourages the defendant to commit the crime, they
have not upheld a due process claim in such cases. Instead, the
courts have typically stated that either the government had not
totally manufactured the crime in question, or that the
defendant's rights were not violated because he was already partici-
pating in ongoing criminal activities, thus due process was not
,compromised. These criteria are substantially the same as those
used in analyzing entrapment cases. Although the due process
defense is theoretically available to a defendant who loses an en-
trapment claim, under the current analysis employed by the courts
he will almost unfailingly lose his due process claim as well, be-
cause the court is merely examining the same factors under a
different heading. Although due process purportedly protects a
defendant from outrageous government conduct, while entrap-
ment protects a non-predisposed defendant who has been induced
to commit a crime, an examination of some of the fact patterns
found in reverse sting/due process cases indicates that the courts
are upholding criminal sanctions largely without completing a
thorough analysis of due process as distinct from entrapment. Ac-
cordingly, the precise contours of due process have remained as
hazy as when the defense was first introduced in Russell
D. Post-Hampton: The Lower Courts' Approach
to Entrapment and Due Process Defenses in Reverse Sting Cases
The lower courts have taken to heart the cautionary language
in Russell that a due process defense should only be granted in
the most outrageous cases.94 Such circumstances, it appears, are
nearly impossible to find. The courts have uniformly refused to
grant the defense, citing numerous policy-related justifications and
drawing seemingly endless distinctions between the facts before
the court and the facts necessary to rise to the level of govern-
ment manufactured crime. Repeated instructions regarding the
94 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (5-4 decision).
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production of drugs,95 elaborate ruses involving the breaking of
oral contracts so as to induce the defendant to accept drugs in
lieu of cash, 6 and even the staging of a car accident and posting
of bail to free the target so he could complete a narcotics transac-
tion,917 have been held to not violate a defendant's due process
rights. With each case, it appears that the line of intolerable po-
lice conduct is being pushed further toward the outlandish. More-
over, since the lower courts agree that the defense must be evalu-
ated in light of the totality of the circumstances, oftentimes the
predisposition of the defendant figures in the evaluation. The
blurring of entrapment and due process evidenced in Supreme
Court decisions has permeated lower court decisions as well. A
sample of recent reverse sting/due process cases illustrates that
due process is faring no better in the lower courts than it has
fared in the Supreme Court.
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Tobias8 affirmed the con-
viction of a defendant who purchased chemicals from a govern-
ment (DEA) operated supply company in order to manufacture
PCP (angel dust).' The defendant answered an ad the DEA had
placed in a magazine, High Times, and requested more information
about the chemicals the government had available.1"' After the
defendant received the DEA's catalog, he ordered the chemicals
necessary to produce cocaine. Before the supplies were shipped,
however, the defendant called the supply company to cancel the
order because he realized he did not have the skill necessary to
manufacture the drug.'0 ' The DEA agent who answered the call
suggested that the defendant try manufacturing PCP instead be-
cause it was simpler."2 The defendant then changed his order,
and eventually, after calling the supply company thirteen times for
advice about the specifics of the manufacturing process, produced
PCP.'05 At this point the DEA searched the defendant's home,
and he was ultimately arrested and convicted of various narcotics
95 United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108
(1982).
96 United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.), vacated sub 'o. United States
v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanded for further findings of fact).
97 United States v. Marino, 936 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1991).
98 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982).
99 Id. at 384.
100 Id. at 383.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 383-84.
103 Id. at 384.
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charges.1 14 Citing United States v. Williams,"0 5  a previous Fifth
Circuit case, the court held that "[a] prosecution may not be de-
feated because the government provides the accused with the
opportunity to commit the crimes charged."" 6 While the court
admonished that "the government may not instigate the criminal
activity, provide the place, equipment, supplies and know-how, and
run the entire operation with only meager assistance from the
defendants without violating fundamental fairness,"107 the court
also asserted that in, order for undercover law enforcement work
to be successful, agents must be allowed to discuss the particulars
of the criminal enterprise with the targeted criminals.108 Stating
that outrageous involvement must be examined in light of the
totality of the circumstances with no one factor controlling,
10'
the court proceeded to review the particular facts before it."'
The fact that the agents had not contacted the defendant regard-
ing the manufacturing process, but rather that the defendant and
his wife had been the ones to contact the DEA was crucial."' It
was this distinction that distinguished Tobias from Hampton v. Unit-
ed States"2 and other cases which had found" due process viola-
tions."3 Because the defendant was a predisposed active partici-
pant, rather than a predisposed inactive participant, the court ulti-
104 Id.
105 613 F.2d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 1980).
106 Tobias, 662 F.2d at 385.
107 Id. at 386.
108 Id. at 385. In this instance, the court noted that "[sluggestions regarding the
particulars of manufacturing one drug or another did not vitiate the predisposition which
is best shown by Tobias' continuance of the conversation." Id.
109 Id. at 387.
110 The Tobias court stated:
The DEA, in this case, did not initiate contact with Tobias. May the gov-
ernment be held to have involved itself in outrageous conduct by placing the ad
in High Times. Similarly, may the government be condemned for shipping the
necessary chemicals, even at cut-rate prices? Or, was it outrageous for DEA to
deliver the chemicals to Tobias's home? We think not. The crucial factor in this
total fact picture is the step-by-step advice given by the DEA agents. This advice
was given to Tobias or his wife on more than thirteen occasions. On each occa-
sion, however, Tobias or his wife contacted the DEA. This would be a more
difficult case if the DEA had pursued Tobias by repeated phone calls and en-
couragement. But here, the drug transaction would have stopped at any time
that Tobias made no further calls.
Id.
111 Id.
112 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (plurality decision).
113 Tobias, 662 F.2d at 387.
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mately held that due process had not been violated." 4 The court
noted, however, that "this case does set the outer limits to which
the government may go in the quest to ferret out and prosecute
crimes in this circuit.""'
Five years later, in 1986, the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Bogart 16 analyzed both the entrapment defense and the due pro-
cess defense as they pertained to a defendant who traded presi-
dential campaign posters, in exchange for cocaine in a deal ar-
ranged by a government informant."7 The government infor-
mant, at the instructions of a law enforcement agent, arranged to
buy a quantity of posters from the defendant, and then at the
time of shipment informed the defendant that his only method of
payment was cocaine.1 The defendant initially refused to com-
plete the transaction, but, needing the proceeds to pay bail, even-
tually agreed to accept the cocaine as payment for the posters.1 9
After first stating that the defendant's predisposition to commit
the crime barred him from asserting the entrapment defense,
20
the court observed that €'[o]nly two circuits have dismissed an in-
dictment in response to a due process outrageous governmental
conduct defense." 2 ' The court expanded upon its analysis by
grouping the cases addressing reverse stings and the due process
defense into two categories: those where the defense has succeed-
ed, and those where the defense has failed. In the cases where the
due process argument has been successful, Bogart noted that the
reviewing courts have determined that the government essentially
manufactured the crime in question.122 The Bogart court found
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.), vacated sub nom. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d
802 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanded for further findings of fact).
117 Id. at 1430.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1432 n.1 ("Here the predisposition of all three defendants to narcotics
trafficking and use is apparent from the record, and thus bars any entrapment de-
fense.").
121 Id. at 1434 (referring to Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971),
which predated Hampton and Russe!4 and United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d dir.
1978)).
122 Id. at 1436.
Criminal sanction is not justified when the state manufactures crimes that would
otherwise not occur. Punishing a defendant who commits a crime under such
circumstances is not needed to deter misconduct; absent the government's in-
volvement, no crime would have been committed. Similarly, a defendant need
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that in those cases where the due process defense was not success-
ful, courts had "invariably conclude[d] that when the government
conduct occurred the defendant was involved in a continuing
series of similar crimes, or that the charged criminal enterprise
was already in progress at the time the government agent became
involved."12 Because it was unclear in Bogart whether the govern-
ment had wholly manufactured the crime charged, or whether the
government had merely infiltrated a continuing criminal enter-
prise, the court remanded the case to determine whether the
government's conduct was sufficiently outrageous under the guide-
lines set forth to uphold a due process defense. 2 4 The Ninth
Circuit, therefore, shed no new light on the due process analysis,
but was content to conduct the due process inquiry using the
guidelines previously employed in due process cases.
The First Circuit followed a similar path in two recent reverse
sting/due process cases. United States v. Panit125  evaluated
government involvement in a drug distribution ring. The govern-
ment seized a shipment of marijuana from Colombia and in-
formed the suspected smuggler (Goldin) that his shipment had
arrived. 26 At this point, federal and state police officers posed ,as
accomplices and assisted Goldin in delivering the marijuana to the
targeted customers. 127 Once the delivery was made, other officers
stopped the customers' cars, conducted searches of the vehicles,
and, then arrested the customers for possession of drugs.12 The
defendant (Panitz) was one of these customers.129 In order to
address the defendant's contention that the government activity
violated due process, 130 the court first reviewed the idea that
"[t]he Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibility that the
government's active participation in a criminal venture may be of
not be incarcerated to protect society if he or she is unlikely to commit a crime
without governnental interference. Nor does the state need to rehabilitate per-
sons who, absent governmental misconduct, would not engage in crime. Where
the police control and manufacture a victimless crime, it is difficult to see how
anyone is actually harmed, and thus punishment ceases to be a response, but
becomes an end in itself ....
Id.
123 Id. at 1437.
124 Id. at 1433, 1438.
125 907 F.2d 1267 (1st Cir. 1990).
126 Id. at 1268.
127 Id. at 1269.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1270.
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so shocking a nature as to violate a defendant's right to due pro-
cess, notwithstanding the defendant's predisposition to commit the
crime."
131
Nevertheless, the court then observed that while it acknowl-
edged "the possibility that the government might in some hypo-
thetical circumstances go too far, we have yet to review a situation
where official conduct crossed the constitutional line; rather, an
unbroken string of First Circuit cases has repulsed attempts to win
dismissal of criminal charges on such a theory."" 2 Thus, like the
Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit's analysis of the due process de-
fense was largely based upon precedent, rather than an applica-
tion of the principles of due process to the facts before it. When
the court examined the case at hand, it held that since the agents
had not invented the crime and enticed Goldin and his compatri-
ots to participate in it (the intercepted shipment of marijuana was
the third the agents had traced to Goldin), but rather had merely
afforded the defendant the opportunity to participate in a pre-
planned crime, due process had not been violated."' The court
then focused on the underlying policy reasons for denying a de-
fendant either an entrapment or due process defense in all but
the most egregious cases:
In the ongoing struggle between law enforcers and the
underworld, the use of ingenuity is not foreclosed to the gov-
ernment. The police may, within reason, employ guile and
clever tactics. When investigating narcotics enterprises, such
stratagems are frequently the option of choice; by their very
nature, drug rings are extremely difficult to penetrate and
detect without undercover intrusion. Not surprisingly, then,
courts have consistently recognized that greater government
involvement is allowable in such cases . .. Law enforcement
need not play the panty-waist when drug smuggling is afoot:
the government may feint and weave, masking its intentions
before striking hard-but not foul-blows."
131 Id. at 1272.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1273. "In sum, the law enforcement practices utilized in this case were
neither fundamentally unfair nor offensive to principles of due process .... The DEA's
elaborate ruse, acting out the script that Goldin authored, fails to shock-or even to
vellicate--our collective conscience." Id.
134 Id. (citation omitted).
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Unfortunately, the court's conclusion that these blows did not
violate due process was based solely upon the ends they achieved;
the court failed to evaluate the propriety of the tactics themselves.
One year later the First Circuit re-affirmed its position regard-
ing defenses to reverse sting operations in United States v. Mal-
no."35 In Marino, a Florida sheriff's department imported marijua-
na and acted as a storage and transportation facility for the send-
ers. 36 Undercover officers then delivered the drugs to a custom-
er (Chabot, one of the co-defendants), and after he had left the
warehouse, other undercover officers staged a car accident with
him.' 37 This "accident" enabled officers to "discover" the drugs,
and arrest Chabot.' A government informant then posted bail
for Chabot so that Chabot would be able to complete the planned
drug transaction." 9 At this point Chabot contacted the undercov-
er agents for another supply of drugs which were to be delivered
to Rhode Island. The Florida police then contacted the Rhode
Island DEA, who were able to videotape the subsequent meetings
between Chabot and the intended buyers (one of whom was the
other defendant)."'
The court refused to acknowledge a due process defense,
reiterating the policy considerations asserted in Panitz.14' The
court ultimately held that "[w]hile police involvement could be so
outrageous as to violate a defendant's due process rights even
where the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime, this is
not such a case." 4' Just why this was not such a case, or what
elements need be present to constitute such a case, was never
articulated. Once again, police tactics came close, but didn't cross
the constitutional line delineating due process. Thus, although the
Supreme Court appeared in Russell and Hampton to leave open the
opportunity for a defendant to assert a due process defense to
reverse sting operations, decisions by the lower courts, as repre-
sented by recent cases in the Fifth, Ninth, and First Circuits, indi-
cate that such a defense is seldom going to be successful.
135 936 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1991).





141 Id. at 27.
142 Id.
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IV. ATrEMPTS TO DEFINE THE DUE PRocEss DEFENSE
As discussed in Part II, one reason that the lower courts are
reluctant to grant a due process defense is the courts' inability to
determine with precision when due process has been violated. 4 .
Recent cases dealing with reverse stings illustrate that this issue is
especially acute when analyzing narcotics-related offenses. The
cases examined above indicate that, due to public policy reasons,
judges often will allow law enforcement agents significant leeway
in combatting narcotics offenses.' An inherent tension exists
between combatting crime and controlling the means used to
wage the war. While we want to censure government tactics, we
also want to ensure that if a person commits a crime he will be
duly punished. When these two concerns conflict, as they do when
a proven criminal is caught via lawiess means, judges are placed in
a difficult position. Do the ends never justify the means, as Justice
Brandeis asserted in Olmstead v. United States,14 or do some ends
justify some means? Certainly these types of policy considerations
have contributed immensely to the courts' reluctance to grant due
process claims in reverse sting cases.
Aside from the inevitable policy concerns in narcotics cases,
due process has further been hampered because the Supreme
Court has failed to define it with precision. The Supreme Court
has provided sketchy guidance for defining outrageous government
conduct pursuant to the due process clause.14 Although Justice
Frankfurter, discussing the entrapment defense in Sherman v. Unit-
143 See United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir.) (discussing the courts'
inability to define precisely the "contours of the outrageous conduct defense."), vacated
sub nom. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanded for further
findings of fact).
144 See United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267 (1st Cir. 1990) (addressing the need
for special law enforcement tactics when investigating narcotics enterprises); accord United
States v. Marino, 936 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Bradley, 820 F.2d 3 (1st
Cir. 1987) (discussing the difficulty of investigating contraband offenses).
145 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
146 See generally Nichols, supra note 13, at 1234:
The due process defense is more nebulous than the predisposition test. The
threshold issue in the due process defense is whether the police techniques
employed were so outrageous that they denied the defendant his right of funda-
mental fairness inherent in due process of law. The defense is problematic in its
application in view of the inability to define such terms as "outrageous" and
"fundamental fairness." Additionally, it rests on the concept of due process, an
area of the law that the Court has persistently and purposefully left hazy.
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ed States,147 pronounced that the courts "have an obligation to
set their face against enforcement of the law by lawless means or
means that violate rationally vindicated standards of justice...
,"14' he provided little concrete guidance concerning precisely
what means are to be considered "lawless" or in violation of "ratio-
nally vindicated standards of justice." While he proceeded to sug-
gest that appeals to sympathy, friendship, and the possibility of
exorbitant gain cannot be tolerated,141 Justice Frankfurter con-
cluded by stating that "[w]hat police conduct is to be con-
demned . . . must be picked out from case to case as new situa-
tions arise involving different crimes and new methods of detec-
tion.150
The conclusion that the entrapment defense must be exam-
ined on an ad hoc basis carried over into the delineation of the
due process defense in United States v. Russell51 and Hampton v.
United States.' Justice Rehnquist expressed doubt in Russell that
the notion of "due process of law can be embodied in fixed
rules." 55 He further stated in Hampton that the proper remedy
for police conduct that goes beyond the scope of police duties lies
not in the application of the due process defense, but rather in a
separate prosecution of the agents under federal or state law.
5 4
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist would only afford a defendant a due
process defense if the police methods violated a protected right of
that defendant.' 5 Justice Brennan's dissent attempted to provide
a little more help in determining what type of police conduct is
acceptable: 'Where the Government's agent deliberately sets up
the accused by supplying him with contraband and then bringing
him to another agent as a potential purchaser, the Government's
role has passed the point of toleration."'5 6 Yet, this guidance is
of little value, since it voices the opinion of the dissent, and the
plurality in Hampton affirmed the conviction based on a determi-
nation that due process had not been violated in this case.'
5 7
147 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
148 Id. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
149 Id. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
150 Id. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
151 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (5-4 decision).
152 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (plurality decision).
153 Russel4 411 U.S. at 431.
154 Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
157 Id. at 490-91.
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The holdings in these Supreme Court cases provided little specific
instruction for the lower courts about the parameters of the due
process defense. 5 8
As the lower courts have attempted to analyze the meaning of
"outrageous" as it pertains to the due process defense, they have
encountered the same difficulties faced by the Supreme Court.
Since no precise definition exists for the term, the lower courts
have typically allowed policy considerations to prove determinative.
Moreover, the courts generally work backwards from the facts to
conclude that conduct either was or was not outrageous, rather
than working forward from a definition of the concept. Instead of
defining outrageous conduct and then analyzing the cases in light
of this definition, the courts characteristically recite a litany of
facts and then cast their votes against the defendant. This method-
ology not only lacks any type of analytical structure, but, because
it is so strongly influenced by social and political pressures, is also
susceptible to anomalous results due to the inherent flux in socio-
political norms. Without a standard to support the courts' deci-
sions, the due process defense is too malleable to prove useful.
Furthermore, the lower courts, like the Supreme' Court, appear to
use the usual entrapment factors-that the government completely
manufactured the crime and that the defendant was previously
involved in criminal activity-to evaluate outrageousness. The re-
sultant meld of entrapment and due process only adds to the
confusion surrounding the definition of outrageousness in the due
process context. As exemplified below, these factors taken together
have resulted in a plethora of lower court due process decisions
which are marked by a striking lack of sound judicial analysis.
Two years after Hampton, the Third Circuit in United States v.
Twigg,5 9 addressed the due process issue. In Twigg a government
informant procured the equipment, raw materials, and site needed
to manufacture speed, and then proceeded to produce the drug
with minimal assistance from the defendants."6 The court began
158 A similar problem exists concerning the entrapment defense. As one writer has
noted, "the Court's failure to expand the [entrapment] defense so that it is consistent
with excuse theory and its refusal to admit that the defense is based on public policy
grounds prevents articulation of a consistent and understandable rationale which would
provide guidance to lower courts." Mary M. Ross, Note, Entrapment Reconsidered: A
Nonexculpatoy Defense Based on the Need for Reciproty Between the Government and the Gov-
erned, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 99, 113 (1988).
159 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
160 Id. at 375-76.
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its analysis by looking to Justice Powell's concurrence in Hampton,
and agreed with him that, in order to determine if government
conduct has been outrageous, the court must "consider the nature
of the crime and the tools available to law enforcement agencies
to combat it."16 1 In so doing, the Twigg court asserted that a dis-
tinction must be made between investigation of manufacturing
operations and investigation of narcotics distribution.162  The
court continued to analyze the permissible range of government
conduct, by first noting that while- infiltration of criminal opera-
tions via undercover agents and informers is acceptable, 163 the
tactics employed in the instant case were not: "Unlike other cases
rejecting [the due process] defense, the police investigation here
was not concerned with an existing laboratory; the illicit plan did
not originate with the criminal defendants; and neither of the
defendants were chemists-an indispensable requisite to this crimi-
nal enterprise."164
To this guidance the court added the admonition of United
States v. Archer 5 that "there is certainly a limit to allowing gov-
ernmental involvement in crime. It would be unthinkable, for
example, to permit government agents to instigate robberies and
beatings merely to gather evidence to convict other members of a
gang of hoodlums."" Taken as a whole, the Twigg court did de-
velop a somewhat more concrete framework within which to ana-
lyze due process claims, but' the delineation was far from precise.
In fact, the court itself was not unanimous in its decision that
Twigg presented a case in which due process had been violated.
Judge Adams in dissent stated that he did not believe that govern-
ment incitement to crime could "be seen as the crucial element
establishing the level of outrageousness necessary to find a viola-
tion of the due process clause."'67 Moreover, the fact that the
161 Id. at 378 n.6.
162 The Twigg court stated:
Hampton was concerned with the sale of an illegal drug, a much more fleeting
and elusive crime to detect than the operation of an illicit drug laboratory. In
such a situation the practicalities of combating drug distribution may require
more extreme methods of investigation, including the supply of ingredients
which the drug ring needs.
Id. at 378 (footnote onitted).
163 Id. at 380.
164 Id. at 381 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
165 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
166 Twdgg, 588 F.2d at 381 n.10 (quoting United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676-
77 (2d Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted)).
167 Id. at 387 (Adams, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Judge Adams stated that "instiga-
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court began its analysis in Twigg by asserting that the type of
crime being combatted must be considered when analyzing a due
process claim revealed that the Third Circuit was willing to let
social policy considerations override faithfulness to the constitu-
tional mandate of due process.
As the lower courts continued to struggle for a workable stan-
dard to apply to the due process defense, the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed the issue in 1980 and 1981.1' Unfortunately, while the
circuit did directly address the question of how to determine the
level of "outrageousness" needed to constitute a due process de-
fense, it failed to provide much practical guidance. Instead, it pre-
ferred to revert to open-ended terms and ad hoc determinations.
In United States v. Williams,69 the defendants repeatedly met with
undercover DEA agents to discuss and plan the manufacturing
and distribution of quaaludes (and the DEA agents allegedly sup-
plied the defendants with a list of necessary ingredients) .17 The
court stated that due process is not violated by the government's
providing the defendant with the opportunity or facilities needed
to commit a crime.
7 1
United .States v. Tobias,172 in which DEA agents ran a chemi-
cal supply company and counselled the defendant over the phone
regarding the manufacture of PCP,7'7 added that the examina-
tion of outrageous conduct does not depend on any one factor,
but rather that the court must look to the totality of the circum-
stances of the case at hand.7' Judge Johnson, dissenting, at-
tempted to consolidate the teachings of other due process cases.
He began by commenting that while government involvement is
sometimes necessary to combat crime, the "degree of Government
involvement is not, however, boundless."'75 Conduct that is so
outrageous that it shocks the conscience constitutes a due process
don of a crime may be 'outrageous' in the context of some forms of criminal activity
but acceptable in the context of others .... To place so heavy an emphasis on instiga-
tion as an important element of 'outrageous' conduct might well make effective enforce-
ment of our drug laws most difficult." Id. at. 387-88 (Adams, J., dissenting).
168 United States v. Williams, 613 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Tobias,
662 F.2d 381 (5tl Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982).
169 613 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1980).
170 Id. at 561-62.
171 Id. at 562.
172 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982).
173 Id. at 383-84.
174 Id. at 387.
175 Id. at 390 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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violation.' 76 Also, if the government activity reaches a certain lev-
el of pervasiveness, the due process defense should be available:
"[W]hen the Government permits itself to become enmeshed in
criminal activity, from beginning to end, to the extent which' ap-
pears here, the same underlying objections which render entrap-




He concluded that while courts should recognize that law enforce-
ment agents need wide latitude in devising appropriate methods
and tactics for combatting crime, and thus judges should be reluc-
tant to overturn convictions based on government overinvolvement
in crime, 'Judicial tolerance of Governmental involvement in crimi-
nal activity should not constitute a carte blanche, there is still a
point beyond which law enforcement officials cannot go." 17 Pre-
cisely where this point lay, however, still remained hazy. While
Judge Johnson would have found the facts in Tobias outrageous
enough to constitute a violation of due process, the majority of
the court disagreed, and upheld the convictions.'7 9 Again, the
holdings and dicta of the Fifth Circuit cases shed little light on
the practical application of the due process defense.
The Eleventh Circuit has fared little better in defining the
contours of the due process defense. In Owen v. Wainwrigh s ° a
deputy sheriff asked an informant to notify him if the informant
learned of anyone desiring to purchase a large quantity of
176 Discussing United States v. Russell and Hampton v. United States, Judge Johnson con-
cluded:
These decisions make clear that as a general rule infiltration and "limited in-
volveient" by Government agents in a drug related enterprise do not run afoul
of the due process clause and in fact constitute a legitimate method of appre-
hending offenders. The Supreme Court also admonished that due process is not
meant to provide federal courts with a "chancellor's foot" veto over investigatory
techniques that lack judicial approbation. The two cases read in tandem dem-
onstrate that only extreme and outrageous Government involvement in the com-
mission of a crime will justify, reversing for that reason a conviction under te
due process clause.
Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 391 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d
783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971)). Additionally, Judge Johnson observed that te "direct, continu-
al involvement by Government agents in the creation, maintenance and comnmission of a
crime, to the extent reflected in this case, goes beyond the perimeter of permissible
conduct and should not be countenanced by this Court." Id. at 393 (Johnson, J., dissent-
ing).
178 Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 389.
180 806 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiamn), ce1. denied, 481 U.S. 1071 (1987).
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narcotics." The informant complied with this request and even-
tually arranged a meeting between the defendants and police offi-
cers, during which the defendants were arrested and ultimately
convicted for drug trafficking.' The defendants raised the due
process defense, based upon the allegation that the informant had
been promised payment on a contingent.fee basis." 3 The Elev-
enth Circuit looked at the totality of the circumstances, and, bal-
ancing the minimal activity of the government informant against
the "substantial contribution to the criminal activity""8 4 of the de-
fendant, held that due process was not violated.' Furthermore,
the court addressed the contention that the government's use of
an informant paid on a contingent fee basis constituted a per se
violation of due process, and asserted that "[c]ontingent fee ar-
rangements with informants have been upheld in this circuit
where the fee is contingent on a successful investigation in general
rather than the successful prosecution of a particular individu-
al."'8 6 While this statement at least provided specific guidance
concerning the use of paid informants as related *to the due pro-
cess defense, it represents only a small step toward delineating just
what conduct is to be considered, "outrageous" enough to warrant
reversal of a criminal conviction on due process grounds.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit in 1986 took another step toward
defining the due process defense by compiling a listing of what
specific activities have proven acceptable governmental conduct. In
United States v. Bogart,187 where the defendant claimed a govern-
ment informant had coaxed him to accept narcotics as payment
for posters the informant had ordered,' the court recognized
the difficulty of drawing the line between acceptable and unac-
ceptable law enforcement tactics. Drawing some general conclu-
sions from previous cases, the court determined that the govern-
ment may: use "artifice and stratagem" to combat crime;8 9 use
paid informants;' supply contraband to defendants to gain
181 I& at 1520.
182 Id. at 1520-21.
183 Id. at 1521.
184 Id. at 1522.
185 Id. at 1524.
186 Id. at 1522 (citations omitted).
187 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.), vacated sub nom. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d
802 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanded for further findings of fact).
188 Id. at 1430.
189 Id. at 1438 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932)).
190 Id. (referencing United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1378 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
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their confidence when working undercover;19 provide necessary
and valuable items to help further a conspiracy that is already in
existence; 92  infiltrate a criminal organization; 9 3  and approach
those already engaged in, or contemplating, criminal action.
194
The listing of unacceptable behavior, unfortunately, was not
nearly as precise. The court merely stated that tactics that "shock
the conscience" are unacceptable.195 These types of activities
were defined as the use of "unwarranted" physical or mental coer-
cion,196 and cases in which the police entirely fabricated the
crime in question in order to procure the defendant's convic-
tion.197 While at first glance the listing of acceptable-law enforce-
ment techniques appears to provide significant guidance regarding
the definition of "outrageous" behavior warranting the due process
defense, the court prefaced this listing with the statement that
"[u]ltimately, every case must be resolved on its own particular
facts."'98 Accordingly, this listing is in no way dispositive. More-
over, no guidance was given regarding the effect of using these ac-
tivities in combination, or whether the use of these techniques
could of itself constitute "unwarranted" mental coercion, and thus
violate due process. These concerns, combined with the vague
assertion of what types of conduct cannot be countenanced by the
courts, detract significantly from the helpfulness of the listing in
delineating the due process defense. 9 9 Additionally, the haziness
denied; 449 U.S. 1080 (1981)).
191 Id. (referencing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973)).
192 Id. (referencing United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 890-91 (9th Cir.), affid per
curiam on remand, 723 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984)).
193 Id. (referencing United States v. Marcello, 731 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984)).
194 Id. (referencing United States v. O'Connor, 737 F.2d 814, 817-18 (9th Cir. 1984)),





199 The court also noted in a footnote the four-factor test used by the New York
Court of Appeals in examining due process defenses:
(1) whether the crime would not have occurred but for the government's assis-
tance in manufacturing the crime or whether the defendants were already in-
volved in ongoing criminal activity; (2) whether the government agents commit-
ted crimes or otherwise acted improperly; (3) whether the government agents
persisted with their inducements to overcome the defendant's reluctance to com-
mit the crime; and (4) whether the government agents' sole motive was to ob-
tain a conviction.
Id. at 1435 n.7. See People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83 (1978).
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surrounding the type of conduct that will not be t6lerated leaves
the due process defense open to the possibility that its parameters
will be determined by the fears and concerns of society at the
time the defense is raised, rather -than by the boundaries of the
Constitution.
While the listing of acceptable police tactics provided in Bo-
gart does .provide perhaps the most concrete guidance concerning
the parameters of the due process defense, it is in reality little
more than an overview of those practices that have been deemed
tolerable in the past.2° Even in Bogart the court primarily relied
on an ad hoc determination of whether or not the facts presented
a case shocking enough to be deemed outrageous. This type of
hindsight methodology is of little practical guidance to a court
reviewing a unique case, or to a law enforcement agency attempt-
However, the court did not adopt this test, and prefaced its notation by stating that "the
precise parameters of such concepts as 'fundamental fairness' and 'universal sense of
justice' are probably indefinable. Perhaps because of these very considerable problems of
philosophy and semantics, no federal court has defined with any sort of precision the
contours of the outrageous conduct defense." Id. at 1435.
200 Various law review articles have also compiled listings of acceptable and unaccept-
able police behavior. &e Franks, supra'note 21, at 405 (footnotes omitted):
Perhaps then, a distinction can be made. On the one hand the govern-
ment provides: (1) the body of the crime itself-the chemicals needed to manu-
facture illegal drugs or the illegal drugs alone; (2) the means by which to ac-
complish an otherwise practically improbable act; and (3) -the temptations to
commit the crime. On the other hand, the government provides the temptations
alone or in addition provides the body of the crime, without having to provide
the means. The former can be characterized by Tuigg as being outrageous. But
the latter, such as supplying the copus delicti itself or supplying only a portion of
the means by which to accomplish the illegal task, does not amount to outra-
geous behavior. Furthermore, merely supplying the fruits, such as bribe money,
to one who already possesses the means, acts of corrupt influence, amounts to
even less.
See also Poole, supra note 21, at 221:
So, even though the due process defense focuses on the government's con-
duct, the defendant should not have been too involved in the crime if due
process is to be a viable alternative defense. For instance, the criminal activity
cannot have already been in existence, the defendant cannot have been in a key
organizational capacity or too active in the crime itself, the defendant cannot
have initiated the contact and the defendant must have been the direct recipi-
ent of the outrageous conduct.
Although the government cannot manufacture crime, there are a number
of things it can do. The government can infiltrate an existing criminal organiza-
tion, use undercover tactics to gain acceptance, supply contraband and other
materials in order to establish a trust relationship, offer inducements, approach
those who are contemplating crime, recruit criminal informants, pay criminal
informants and provide an opportunity to commit the crime.
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ing to formulate policy. The courts tend to define outrageousness
as one of three things: impermissible importuning of the defen-
dant to commit a crime; recourse to violence on the part of the
government officials; or the total manufacture of the crime in
question. These are the entrapment factors being used to deter-
mine when government conduct is deemed outrageous, thus trig-
gering the due process defense. The reiteration of this same crite-
ria has hindered the courts from distinguishing due process from
entrapment, and in turn has prevented courts from adequately de-
veloping the due process defense. When this problem is combined
with the pressures of the underlying policy considerations which
surface in narcotics cases, it is of little wonder that due process
has not fared well in the reverse sting context. Consequently,
there remains a need for a workable, prospective standard by
which to objectively evaluate due process claims.
V. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT JUSTIFICATION: A PROPOSED
METHODOLOGY FOR DELINEATING THE DUE PROCESS DEFENSE
A. Introduction
Justice Powell in Hampton v. United States"0 1 acknowledged
that defining the proper limitations of police involvement in par-
ticular situations is a difficult task.0 2" Yet, he also asserted that
he did not "despair of [the Court's] ability, in an appropriate case
to identify appropriate standards for police practices without rely-
ing on the 'chancellor's' [sic] 'fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism."' 203 Nevertheless, questions still arise concerning
the viability and even the appropriateness of the due process de-
fense. °4 Professor Marcus has noted that some critics of the due.
201 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (plurality decision).
202 Id. at 494-95 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 495 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
172 (1952)) (citations omitted).
204 In analyzing the objective entrapment defense, Professors Stitt and James asserted:
The objective test would immunize chronic offenders from future prosecution
because if the police were issued clear and unambiguous rules to follow in po-
tential entrapment situations, these rules would inevitably become known to
criminals as well. They could then protect themselves by making sure that any-
one with whom they dealt broke at least one of those rules ....
Another related argument is that it would be impossible to formulate a set
of rules that would work .... It is also argued that one cannot formulate a
criterion of just and reasonable action apart from the circumstances of particular
cases.
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process defense have called for its abolition.0 5 Countering Judge
Easterbrook's assertion that the due process defense should be
abandoned, Professor Marcus stated that the significance of the
defense is not found in the fact that it will often be successful,
because it will not. Rather, "it is important because it creates outer
limits on appropriate law enforcement techniques and because it
clearly demonstrates to the legal and law enforcement communi-
ties, and to society at large, that courts are indeed willing to draw
some lines that cannot be crossed even in pursuit of crimi-
nals."206 Just because defining these limits is not an easy task
does not mean that the due process defense should be aban-
doned, either in theory or in practice. As exemplified by the cases
analyzed above, the problems attendant to, defining the contours
of the due process defense have rendered it impotent in practice.
As Professor Marcus explained, however, the due process defense
is a necessary and vital part of the criminal law. It should not be
cast aside merely because it presents some analytical difficulties.
While drawing the line delineating acceptable and unacceptable
police conduct is admittedly difficult, it is not impossible, and only
when such a line is drawn will the due process defense become a
viable element of the criminal law.
In 1855, in Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improve-
ment Co.,20 the Court instructed that in England the concept of
Stitt & James, supra note 50, at 121. Due to the similarities between the objective entrap-
ment standard and the due process defense, these concerns could also be applied to due
process.
205 One such critic that Professor Marcus discusses is Judge Easterbrook:
Judge Easterbrook [in United States v. Mller] offered two reasons why the
court should reject the due process contention. First, he looked to the "false
hope" dilemma. The Seventh Circuit has never reversed a conviction on the
basis of the "outrageous governmental conduct" defense ....
Second, and more forcefully, he wrote that the defense is not appropriate
where narrow standards cannot be fashioned for law enforcement officials .....
Moreover, he wrote, even if such a defense were to be viewed as good policy, it
is simply impossible to apply in specific cases.
Marcus, supra note 13, at 464 (footnote omitted).
206 Id. at 465. Professor Marcus countered Judge Easterbrook's second argument that
"if reasonable people could not possibly agree on the application of the defense, doesn't
that prove that it is a defense that itself 'is not a rile of any kind, let alone a command
of the Due Process Clause'?" with the statement that "[t]he initial response to this argu-
mient must be that it is not factually accurate. There will be fact situations where reason-
able people could agree that the law enforcement behavior was utterly outrageous." Id.
(footnote omitted).
207 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
due process was intended to convey the same meaning as "by the
law of the land.""' Consequently, due process is inexorably tied
to the concept of lawfulness. That which is lawless209 violates due
process. That which is lawless also falls outside the law enforce-
ment justification. As a result, a nexus exists between the concepts
of due process and the law enforcement justification. By ascertain-
ing the point at which officers of the law lose the defense of the
law enforcement justification, we simultaneously discover the point
at which a criminal defendant should be entitled to the due pro-
cess defense. Approaching the due process defense via the law
enforcement justification is an attractive alternative to analyzing
the due process defense directly. Not only does this approach
provide more concrete guidelines regarding what tactics are unac-
ceptable, but it also removes the analysis somewhat from the so-
cially and politically charged narcotics arena by focusing on the
conduct of the law enforcement agents rather than on the drug
offender.
B. The Law Enforcement Justification
The law enforcement justification is a subset of the larger
defense of justification. The Model Penal Code states:
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to
avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable,
provided that:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such con-
duct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense charged; and
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense
provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situa-
tion involved; and
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification
claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
2 10
The comment to the section explains "a principle of necessity,
properly conceived, affords a general justification for conduct that
would otherwise constitute an offense. 2 1 ' Accordingly, contrary
208 Id. at 276.
209 Black's Law Dictionary defines "lawless" as "[not] subject to law; not controlled by
law; not authorized by law; not observing the nles and forms of law." BLACK'S LAw DIc-
TIONARY 886 (6th ed. 1990).
210 Model Penal Code § 3.02 (Official Draft 1962).
211 Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Comment to § 3.02 at 9-14 (1985); see also
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4(a) at 441 (2d ed. 1986)
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to the opinion of Justice Brandeis,212 the law accepts the princi-
ple that at times the ends do justify the means. Wayne R. LaFave
and Austin W. Scott, Jr., two leading scholars in the area of crimi-
nal law, relate the doctrine of justification to the choice of evils:
"When the pressure of circumstances presents one with a choice
of evils, the law prefers that he avoid the greater evil by bringing
about the lesser evil." 213 This exception to criminal culpability is
borne out in the doctrines of self-defense 214 and defense of oth-
ers. 2 15 Similarly, the doctrine provides the underpinnings for the
law enforcement justification.
LaFave and Scott describe the law enforcement justification as
a defense to what would "otherwise [be] criminal conduct of a
police officer, or a private person acting on behalf of an offi-
cer, . . . pursuing law enforcement purposes at the time."216 Ac-
cordingly, law enforcement agents are privileged to engage in
certain conduct, without criminal sanctions, that would be criminal
if engaged in by private persons.217 This doctrine does not, of
course, provide carte blanche to police officers to engage in any
("One who, under the pressure of circumstances, commits what would otherwise be a
crime may be justified by 'necessity' in doing as he did and so not be guilty of the
crime in question.").
212 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
213 LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 211.
214 Self-defense is sanctioned if the following conditions are fulfilled:
One who is not the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using a reasonable
amount of force against his adversary when he reasonably believes (a) that he is
in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and (b) that
the use of such force is necessary to avoid this danger.
Id. at § 5.7.
215 Defense of others is allowed under the following circumstance:
The prevailing rule is that one is justified in using reasonable force in
defense of another person, even a stranger, when he reasonably believes that the
other is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and
that the use of such force is necessary to avoid this danger.
Id. at § 5.8.
216 Id. at § 5.11(d); see also United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1528 (7th Cir.
1985) ("In many categories of cases it is necessary for the agents to commit acts that,
standing by themselves, are criminal . . . .The agents' acts merely appear criminal; they
are not, because they are performed without the - state of mind necessary to support a
conviction."), rert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986).
217 2 G. ROBERT BLAKEY, TECHNIQUES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
ORGANIZED CRIME: MANUALS OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 1 40 (1980). This principle also dis-
proves Justice Brandeis' assertion in Oastead v. United States that government agents and
private citizens must be treated identically with regard to criminal conduct and the resul-
tant sanctions. Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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type of police conduct. Professor G. Robert Blakey explains that
the law enforcement justification only applies if "the conduct is
within the reasonable exercise of the policeman's duty ... "218
The question then becomes what constitutes a "reasonable" exer-
cise. Reasonableness is not merely a nebulous standard proposed
to replace the indefinite outrageousness standard currently used in
the due process defense.
Unlike the outrageousness inquiry, courts have been successful
in drawing a bright line in justification cases regarding what type
of conduct is unreasonable. This line essentially separates the
violent from the non-violent criminal offense. Acts that are merely
malum prohibitum219 are allowed in any number of circumstances
without penal sanction. Accordingly, if a law enforcement officer
engages in such conduct in the performance of his official duties,
he is typically given the law 'enforcement justification. Acts that are
malum in se,220 however, are only permitted in a very limited
number of instances. Such occasions occur when the defendant is
faced with imminent physical violence and there is no alternative
(as in self-defense and the defense of others). If a law enforce-
ment officer engages in violence, he will have to meet these two
218 BLAKEY, supra note 217, at 1 41. Professor Blakey also noted:
Law enforcement officers are permitted, of course, to violate the literal terms of
certain penal statutes. No one seriously doubts, for example, that they may pos-
sess narcotics, number slips, etc. The issue is one of kind and degree. Some
conduct of law enforcement officers in undercover roles is clearly illegal; at
some point feigned participation in a crime bears such resemblance to the
crime itself that society cannot tolerate the conduct. No one doubts that they
could not work in an undercover role in the investigation of a juvenile rape
gang and actually participate in a rape. On the other hand, courts have been
tolerant in permitting extensive police participation in certain illegal activities.
The question is how far may police and prosecutors go in engaging in conduct
that would otherwise be a crime?
Id. at 35.
219 Such an act is defined as: "A wrong prohibited; a thing which is wrong because
prohibited; an act which is not inherently immoral, but becomes so because its commis-
sion is expressly forbidden by positive law; an act involving an illegality resulting from
positive law." BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 960 (6th ed. 1990).
220 Black's Law Dictionary defines malum in se as:
A wrong in itself; an act or case involving illegality from the very nature of the
transaction . . . . An act is said to be inalum in se when it is inherently and
essentially evil, that is, immoral in its nature and injurious in its consequences,
without any regard to the fact of its being noticed or punished by the law of
the state. Such are most or all of the offenses cognizable at common law (with-
out the denouncement of a statute) ....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 958 (6th ed. 1990).
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requirements before he will be afforded the defense of the law
enforcement justification. Reasonable conduct is thus judged in
terms of whether the law enforcement agent's conduct involved an
act that is thought to be evil without regard to the circumstances,
or whether the act merely violated a mandate of positive law. This
analytical framework provides significant guidance to courts at-
tempting to determine whether a law enforcement officer's con-
duct was reasonable so as to warrant the invocation of the law
enforcement justification.
Since the question of reasonableness is ultimately a matter of
law, numerous courts have analyzed the types of police conduct
that can be considered reasonable, and thus deserving of the law
enforcement justification. When evaluating the reasonableness of
law enforcement tactics, courts generally look to either codes of
professional ethics or clearly established, independent rules of
law.2 While the Supreme Court has asserted that it does not
have the authority to "mandate a code of behavior for state offi-
cials wholly unconnected to any federal right or privilege,"
222
lower courts have been willing to dismiss indictments based on
various forms of prosecutorial misconduct.223 The rationale gen-
erally invoked is that such a dismissal will act as a deterrent to
similar misconduct in the future.224  Although United States v.
221 &e In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333 (Il. 1979); see also United States v. Archer,
486 F.2d 670, 676-77 n.6 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[L]aw enforcement practices . . . remain sub-
ject to 'constitutional and statutory limitations and to judicially fashioned rules to enforce
those limitations.'" (quoting Russell v. United States, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973))); Den 'ex
dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276-77
(1855):
To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain whether this process,
enacted by congress, is due process? To this the answer must be twofold. We
must examine the constitution itself, to see whether this process be in conflict
with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of
England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to
have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted
on by them after the settlement of this country.
222 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986).
223 See United States v. Owen, 580 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Under its inherent
supervisory powers, a federal court is empowered to dismiss an indictment on the basis
of governmental misconduct.").
224 Id. ("[D]isnissal is used as a prophylactic tool for discouraging future deliberate
governmental impropriety of a similar nature."); see also United States v. Lopez, 765 F.
Supp. 1433, 1464 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("[T]he court is convinced that no remedy short of
dismissal will have any significant deterrent effect on future government misconduct of
the type found in this case.").
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OwenF225 stated that "these supervisory powers 'remain a harsh,
ultimate sanction [which] are more often referred to than
invoked,''226 courts have invoked them when warranted.
For example, in 1991, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California dismissed an indictment based on
the prosecutor's failure to follow state disciplinary rules.227 In
reaching this conclusion, the court held that "[a]t a mini-
mum, . . . government prosecutors must scrupulously obey ethical
rules adopted by the court."22' This sentiment was followed in In
re Friedman.2' In Friedman, a prosecutor violated the Disciplinary
Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility by instructing
police officers to testify falsely in court if necessary, and to accept
bribes from corrupt attorneys, in order to gather evidence for a
future prosecution of those attorneys.3 ° The task before the
court was to determine if disciplinary measures were warranted,
and if so, what the proper nature of those sanctions should
be.23 ' Analyzing these issues, the court emphatically stated that
"[tihe integrity of the courtroom is so vital to the health of our
legal system that no violation of that integrity, no matter what its
motivation, can be condoned or ignored., 232 The court thus stat-
ed that engaging in activity that jeopardized that integrity, in this
case by creating and using false evidence in court to investigate
corrupt attorneys, not only violated ethical norms of the legal
profession, but could also have resulted in criminal sanction.
While the court in Friedman did not discipline the respondent, it
did send out a warning to other government officials that such
conduct would be sanctioned in the future.23 This result neces-
sarily followed from the fact that the court in Friedman was, like
Justice Brandeis, unwilling to accept that at times the ends may
225 580 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1978).
226 Id. at 367 (quoting United States v. Baskes, 433 F. Supp. 799, 806 (N.D. Ill.
1967)).
227 Lope, 765 F. Supp. at 1464.
228 Id. at 1463.
229 392 N.E.2d 1333 (Ill. 1979).
230 Id. at 1333-34.
231 Id. at 1334.
232 Id. at 1335. The court applied this concept to the case at hand, and concluded
that "even if no other ways existed to ferret out bribery [by corrupt attorneys], the re-
spondent would still not be privileged to engage in unethical (and perhaps illegal) con-
duct." Id. at 1336.
233 "Because respondent acted without the guidance of precedent or settled opinion
and because there is apparently considerable belief. . . that he acted properly in con-
ducting the investigations, we conclude that no sanction should be imposed." Id.
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justify unique means. Because the court refused to recognize the
existence of areas of the law that allow the justification of other-
wise unacceptable means in light of compelling circumstances, the
analysis stopped before reaching the actual issue in controversy.
The court never really discussed the possible applicability of the
law enforcement justification beyond the fact that codes of profes-
sional ethics may play a role in determining when criminal con-
duct by government officials will be sanctioned.
Moreover, the court in Friedman held the prosecutor to ethical
standards designed to govern conduct among private attorneys.
Just as the conduct of law enforcement agents is not judged by
the same standards as that of private citizens, the actions of prose-
cutors should not be judged by standards formulated to guide
private attorneys. Although the court rightly asserted that codes of
professional ethics constitute one method of determining reason-
ableness in the context of the law enforcement justification, it
used the wrong code of professional ethics. Because Friedman did'
not properly evaluate the ethical propriety of the prosecutor's
actions, and thereby concluded that he had acted unreasonably,
the court failed to correctly apply the law enforcement justifica-
tion.
.Besides ethical standards, courts also look to an officer's ad-
herence to state and federal laws when examining the reasonable-
ness of the officer's conduct in the context of the law enforce-
ment justification. To be eligible for a federal law enforcement
justification, an officer's conduct must be authorized under federal
law and be sanctioned by the appropriate state authorities.
23 4
Cunningham v. NeagleW 35 was one of the first cases to analyze the
law enforcement justification as applied to a federal officer (in this
case a marshall) who violated state law. The case came to the
Supreme Court on an appeal by a California sheriff, who protest-
ed the circuit court's order that he discharge the defendant from
his custody."6 The sheriff had imprisoned the defendant for
murder because the defendant had killed a man who allegedly was
234 See Baucom v. Martin, 677 F.2d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1982) (relying on
Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890)):
That a deliberate violation of state law may render federal law enforcement
more convenient is insufficient to shield the agent from state prosecution ....
Neagle requires first that the federal officer be in the performance of an act
which he is authorized by federal law to do as part of his duty.
235 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
236 Id. at 3.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
about to attack Justice Field.3 7 The defendant had been instruct-
ed by the Attorney General of the United States to accompany Jus-
tice Field, in anticipation of a violent attack upon the Justice."'8
Justice Miller wrote the opinion for the Court, and, concluding
that the marshall was properly discharged from the state's custody
by the circuit court,"9 determined that the duty of the marshall
was to be "derived from the general scope of his duties under the
laws of the United States .. . "24 Accordingly, the marshall was
justified in committing homicide in order to ward off an attack on
the Supreme Court Justice he was assigned to protect, even
though this action was not specifically sanctioned anywhere.
241
Nearly one hundred years later, Judge Wood, in Baucom v.
Martin,242 addressed the federal law enforcement justification and
the interplay between federal agents and state laws. The defen-
dant, a federal agent investigating alleged bribery by a district
attorney, was himself charged with bribery when the targeted dis-
trict attorney turned the tables and had the local authorities arrest
the informants. 23 This arrest led to the revelation that the feder-
al agent had authored the bribery attempt,244 resulting in his
being charged with attempted bribery as vell.245 Discussing the
breaking of state law in a federal investigation, Judge Wood stated
that "[o]nce any degree of illegal state activity is sanctioned as a
means of federal law enforcement, unavoidable problems may be
anticipated as to where to draw the line in each case." 246 He also
noted that a federal officer does not receive absolute state immu-
nity simply because of his status and the fact that the conduct was
undertaken as part of a federal investigation.2 47 To determine
237 Id. at 4.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 76.
240 Id. at 59.
241 Baucom analyzed the decision in Neage in the following terms:
In Neagie, it was held that the necessary authority could be derived from the
general scope of the officer's duties. The duty of the executive branch to en-
force the laws of the United States and to employ agents to assist in that pur-
pose by detecting and prosecuting crimes against the United States, as provided
by statute, requires no elaboration.
Baucoin v. Martin, 677 F.2d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1982) (footnote omitted).
242 677 F.2d 1346 (11th Cir. 1982).
243 Id. at 1347-48.
244 Id. at 1348.
245 Id. at 1347.
246 Id. at 1350.
247 Id.
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when such immunity should be granted, Judge Wood looked to
the two-prong test set forth in Neagle.24 s The first factor requires
that the officer claiming the law enforcement justification be per-
forming an act that he is authorized by federal law to perform as
part of his duties.249 The second prong requires that the officer
carefully circumscribe his actions so. as to do no more than is
necessary and proper.2 0  After examining these requirements,
Judge Wood did not rule out the possibility that a federal officer,
in good faith, could receive immunity via the law enforcement
justification when he broke state laws. Nevertheless, "[d]eliberate
violations of state law for federal purposes must be the rare excep-
tion, and be clearly seen to be reasonable, necessary, and prop-
er."251 The court held that in this case, especially in light of the
fact that the investigation was a joint effort involving both federal
and state agents, the officer should not be held criminally liable
for bribery.
52
Various courts have, like Baucom, made determinations regard-
ing what types of law enforcement tactics can be employed while
still affording the officers the law enforcement justification.253 Al-
so, like Baucom, most look at the two factors outlined in Neagle,
often incorporating an additional good faith requirement.2 54 In
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. Judge Wood also commented:
The use of undercover agents is not per se unlawful. It is a recognized technique
commonly utilized in narcotic cases. Cases are often made by the purchase of
narcotics by undercover agents from peddlers. The purchase as well as 'sale of
narcotics may constitute a state violation, but seldom gives rise to state objec-
tions.
Id. (citations omitted).
251 Id. at 1351.
252 Id.
253 But see United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1468 (9th Cir.) ("[O]ur Constitu-
tion leaves it to the political branches of government to decide whether to regulate law
enforcement conduct which may 'offend some fastidious squeamishness or private senti-
mentalism about combatting crime too energetically ... ..'(quoting Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952))), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987).
254 See Baucom, 677 F.2d at 1350; biut see United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1269
(7th Cir. 1989) ("The Constitution does not require the government to have a preexist-
ing good faith basis for suspecting criminal activity before initiating an undercover investi-
gation .... ").
One method of determining whether or not objective good faith has been met
would be to evaluate the officer's conduct in light of applicable administrative guidelines.
For example, F.B.I. agents would be held to strict compliance with the Attorney General's
Guidelines on F.B.I. Undercover Operations that involve what would otherwise be illegal
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some instances these requirements will not be met, resulting in
successful prosecution of the officer who engaged in the illegal
activity. It is at this point that the defendant should receive the
protection of the due process defense. As stated above, to success-
fully invoke the law enforcement justification, the court must de-
termine not only that the agent's authorization to commit the act
was clear,255 but also that the agent's conduct was reasonable.
Besides looking to codes of professional conduct and federal and
state laws when analyzing reasonableness, it is also helpful to look
to the analysis employed in civil immunity cases.
Powers v. Lightne2 56 illustrated this concept when addressing
a claim of qualified immunity by F.B.I. agents who devised a sting
operation that involved dealing in stolen property.25 7 The agents
sold valid auto titles to suspects who ran a "retagging" busi-
ness.258 These suspects then sold the retagged cars to auction-
eers, who in turn sold them to used car dealers. 25 The appellee
was a used car dealer who had innocently sold one of these
retagged cars to a customer. When the sting operation ter-
minated, the car was seized and returned to its proper owner, and
the woman who had purchased the car from the appellee sued
him. 261 The appellee in turn sued the two F.B.I. agents, who
claimed the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.26 2 The
court balanced the interest of the government in successfully
maintaining the sting operation against the interest of the injured
party in receiving indemnification for his loss. In weighing the
competing interests, the court stated that the "'facts of the existing
case law must closely correspond to the contested action before
the defendant official is subject to liability .... 263 Since there
was no closely related case law to indicate to the appellants that
their actions in the sting operation were unreasonable, the court
activity. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 3.
255 See United States v. Ehrlichnan, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that the
defendant had violated 18 U.S.C. § 241 by committing burglary, and that there was no
justification premised on national security grounds, via authorization of the President or
the Attorney General.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
256 820 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiamn), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1078 (1988).





262 Id. at 820-21.
263 Id. at 822 (quoting Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
479 U.S. 848 (1986)).
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held that they were entitled to qualified immunity.264 " While this
case specifically addressed the defense of qualified immunity, not
the law enforcement justification, it provides helpful guidance for
determining when a law officer's conduct is to be deemed reason-
able, so as to afford him the protection of the law enforcement
justification.
The Illinois Appellate Court in Chaney v. Department of Law
EnforcemenZ and the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois in Stokes v. City of Chicago? have discussed the
issue of reasonableness in both the criminal and civil contexts. In
Chaney, two Illinois Bureau of Investigation agents had been or-
dered to open and operate a tavern as part of an undercover
operation. 267 Concerned about the legality of the project, the
agents refused to return to the tavern, and consequently were
dismissed from the Bureau.21 Observing that the agents' super-
intendent directed them to violate several laws, 269 the court ad-
monished that the objective of obtaining a criminal conviction did
not justify the use of criminal conduct by government officials-in
this case the illegal acts of opening and operating the tavern with
an unlawful liquor license.270  The court fully endorsed the
Brandeis view of means-ends: "It is illegal, and indeed totally inap-
propriate, that law enforcement officers be ordered to break the
law. The total learning available to guide us in our conduct
teaches that an illegal or immoral means cannot be utilized to
reach a legal or 'desirable' end."271 The court concluded that if
such illegal means are needed to successfully enforce the law, it is
the duty of the legislature to validate those means.272 According-
ly, the officers were justified in their concern that they would not
be protected from either state criminal prosecution by the law
enforcement justification, or civil suits by qualified immunity, since
264 Id. at 823. Moreover, the court stated that "[q]ualified immunity shields govern-
ment officials Tfrom liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.'" Id. at 821 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); accord
Stokes v. City of Chicago, 744 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Il. 1990).
265 393 N.E.2d 75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
266 744 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Il. 1990).
267 Chaney, 393 N.E.2d at 76-77.
268 Id. at 78.
269 Id. at 80.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 80-81.
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the court ultimately found their actions to have been unreason-
able.
In Stokes v. City of Chicago271 the issues of law enforcement
justification and civil liability were addressed in the context of
officers who suborned perjured testimony for use before a grand
jury. 4 The plaintiffs contended that the perjured testimony re-
sulted in an illegal indictment, arrest, and prosecution. 7 5 The
court began its discussion by reciting that the law has never grant-
ed civil immunity in this context.7 6 Moreover, the court express-
ly stated that "[a] police officer who allegedly knowingly obtains
an indictment or makes an arrest in violation of an individual's
constitutional rights can be sued under [42 U.S.C. sec. 1983] for
damages."2 77 Finally, in holding that the officers were not enti-
tled to qualified immunity, the court asserted that even in the ab-
sence of a judicial decision or a specific statutory enactment per-
taining to this precise situation, a reasonable officer would have
known that knowingly using false evidence is illegal. 7 s Where, as
in Chaney and Stokes, the court finds an officer's actions so unrea-
sonable as to deprive him of qualified immunity in the civil con-
text, he should also be denied the law enforcerpent justification in
the criminal context. The Stokes court itself tied the issue of civil
immunity to the law enforcement justification concept, stating in a
footnote that:
State and federal law generally prohibit assault, battery,
use of deadly force, criminal damage to property, weapons
possession, and so forth; all of these prohibitions contain ex-
ceptions for police officers on terms not applicable to ordinary
citizens. There are no such general exceptions for police offi-
cers in those laws which prohibit false testimony or its suborna-
tion before courts and juries. At most are found exceptions
permitting police officers to provide false information on such
things as license application forms and corporation reports in
the performance of undercover work, with explicit approval of
273 744 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. I1 1990).
274 Id. at 184.
275 Id. at 185.
276 Id. at 186.
277 Id. The court also commented: "In Malley v. Briggs [475 U.S. 335 (1986)], the Su-
preme Court specified that issuance of an arrest warrant only provides police officers with
qualified inmunity and qualified immunity does not protect from liability an officer who
acts on warrant where that reliance is not objectively reasonable." Id. at 187-88.
278 Id. at 188.
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superiors, prosecutors or courts .... 279
While the footnote in Stokes appears to modify the Chaney position
that there is no law enforcement justification available for falsify-
ing an application for a liquor license, etc., the concerns raised in
Chaney are still valid. There is a point at which "enough is more
than enough-it is just too much."211 It is at this point that the
law enforcement justification fails, and the due process defense
should prevail.
C. Summation of the Law Enforcement Justification
Because the law recognizes that in certain situations otherwise'
unlawful means are justified by the ends they serve, the law en-
forcement justification will provide government officials with im-
munity for actions related to their official duties if they acted in a
reasonable manner. The acts that fall into this category are to be
derived from the general duties of the officer, and do not neces-
sarily have to be specifically enumerated .2  To determine reason-
ableness, the above analysis indicates that a number of factors
must first be met. To begin, the violent character of the act in
question must be taken into account. If the act is malum in se, the
officer must prove that he was faced with imminent physical vio-
lence and had no reasonable alternative in order to invoke the
law enforcement justification. If the act is merely malum prohibitum,
exceptions to criminal sanction are more common, and the officer
need not show the two additional factors required for acts malum
in se. Once this threshold inquiry is made, courts may also exam-
ine a number of other factors when evaluating the reasonableness
of an officer's Conduct. As exemplified in United States v. Owen,2 2
United States v. Lopnz8 s  and In re Friedman,28 4 an officer who
violates the applicable code of professional- ethics28 5 will most
likely be deemed to have acted unreasonably. Also, Cunningham v.
279 Id. at 18.8, n.4.
280 Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
281 See Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
282 580 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1978).
283 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
284 392 N.E.2d 1333 (Ill. 1979).
285 For example, the MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) would apply to
attorneys, judges, etc.; the SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, would apply to FBI agents; Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) guidelines would apply to DEA agents; Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) guidelines would apply to INS agents.
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Neaga 8 6 and Baucom v. Martin28 7 instruct that an act that vio-
lates state law and is not properly authorized, narrowly tailored to
the objective, and performed in good faith, will not be reasonable,
and thus will fall outside the law enforcement justification. Rea-
sonableness is also evidenced if the officer strictly complied with
the appropriate administrative guidelines 8 and acted in confor-
mity with the standards clearly set forth in existing case law.
289
Analogizing to civil cases, while an officer will be granted qualified
immunity if he has not violated clearly established constitutional
or statutory rights,'o0 Stokes v. City of Chicago29' indicates that,
even in the absence of a judicial decision or a specific statutory
enactment, action which a reasonable officer would know violates
a person's constitutional rights will not receive even qualified
immunity.292 Such a finding would provide evidence that the
agent failed to act reasonably, and thus should be denied the law
enforcement justification if applicable. If the officer is found to
have acted unreasonably as determined by the above requirements,
he will not be eligible for the law enforcement justification. As a
result, his actions are deemed lawless, and consequently should
constitute a violation of due process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Evaluating due process cases in light of the law enforcement
justification would provide a structured, yet flexible, standard by
which a court could evaluate government conduct. This method is
preferable to the open-ended outrageousness standard currently
employed by the Supreme Court in evaluating the due process
defense because the law enforcement justification is evaluated in
the context of applicable administrative guidelines and statutes,
constitutional rights, and existing case law. These norms provide
an analytical framework that is objectively structured, yet capable
of the flexibility required to evaluate specific fact situations. Such
an analysis would provide government officials with guidelines to
286 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
287 677 F.2d 1346 (11th Cir. 1982).
288 See United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Friedman, 392
N.E.2d 1333.
289 See Powers v. Lightner, 820 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), cet. denie4
484 U.S. 1078 (1988).
290 See Id.
291 744 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Ill 1990).
292 Id. at 188.
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which they can conform their conduct so that due process could
be evaluated both prospectively and retroactively. Moreover, analy-
sis grounded in the law enforcement justification would alleviate
the current blurring -of the entrapment and due process defenses
resulting from the use of the same factors to distinguish each
defense. Such a methodology would not only provide law enforce-
ment agencies clearer guidelines so that they could proceed confi-
dently with narcotics investigations, but would also insulate the
court system from haphazard judicial decisions. While successful
due process claims would most likely be small in number, they
would at least be in accord with the Constitution.
Whenever a nation is faced with an evil that threatens the
underpinnings of society, it is tempting to compromise personal
liberties to combat the threat. Such is the case regarding the cur-
rent fight against narcotics in the United States. Senator Edward
M. Kennedy, in a recent address to the American Bar Association,
discussed the role of the Constitution in the nation's battle against
drugs.293 Recognizing that the war on drugs is beginning to ex-
ert pressure on the Fifth Amendment right to due process,2 4 he
admonished: 'The Constitution is perfectly capable of accommo-
dating the legitimate interests of law enforcement-but end runs
around the Bill of Rights are unacceptable, and it is irresponsible
for any administration committed to the rule of law to try
them.""5 It appears from analyzing many of the reverse sting
cases that have rejected the due process defense, that courts are
coming dangerously close to ignoring a defendant's due process
rights in the face of public policy concerns regarding the war on
drugs. "Our constitutional rights do not contribute to the drug
problem, and compromising them will not solve it. We do not
need to trample the Bill of Rights to win the war on drugs."2
6
The fact that our nation is faced with a social problem that is
daily approaching tragic proportions does not mean that due pro-
cess rights need no longer be protected. The Constitution has
endured for two centuries because the courts have not sacrificed
its protections in the face of current social problems.297 Judge
293 Edward M. Kennedy, Fight Evi4 Forget Freedom, HUM. RTS., Fall/Winter 1990, at 36,
36.
294 Id. at 37.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 46.
297 As Justice McKenna observed:
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Zagel in Stokes v. City of Chicago 8 eloquently expressed the enor-
mity of the problem facing law enforcement officers in combatting
crime:
Policing is a lofty calling, vital to the public weal, often
heroic in action. The grace and worth of the work usually
remains unseen and unappreciated by those it serves. In grime
and squalor, facing danger and fury, bearing witness to what is
worst in men and women-even police officers sometimes lose
sight of the dignity of their service.2
Nevertheless, these problems, and the gravity of the social
harms resulting from narcotics offenses in the United States, do
not justify violating the due process rights of individuals. Although
the law recognizes that at times ends may justify means, the es-
sence of constitutional due process is that lawlessness will not be
tolerated, no matter how socially desirable the goal. As Justice
Brandeis cautioned:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily
confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be
vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.
This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments,
designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice
Marshall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can
approach it." The future is their care and provision for events of good and bad
tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitu-
tion, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what
may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of applica-
tion as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would
have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless for-
mulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
298 744 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. I11. 1990).
299 Id. at 188.
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Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to pro-
tect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent.'
Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of
their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding5s°
Gail M. Greaney
300 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (5-4 decision) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).

